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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DANGER TO PUBLIC SPACES
A. A Call for Public Order
The cities of the United States are rapidly losing their public spaces. From
Atlanta to Seattle, from San Francisco to New York City, people are abandoning
their urban areas out of a perception that street disorder is rising, making cities
no longer welcome places to live, work, or voluntarily spend time.
Not all urbanites are giving up. Many City Councils have been convinced
to adopt new and innovative controls on anti-social behavior to maintain minimal
standards of public conduct and to keep public spaces safe and attractive. These
ordinances range from prohibitions on camping in parks to restrictions on lying
down on sidewalks.' One of the most common examples of these efforts are
ordinances aimed at aggressive begging.
Current efforts to limit begging are motivated by a desire to build and
maintain a diverse, responsible, and interactive community, by maintaining and
preserving viable public spaces where that community can interact. This is
possible only when minimum standards of public decency are observed.2 No
one, rich or poor, white or black or hispanic, gay or heterosexual, Jew or Gentile,
is 6enefitted when walking down a city street is an onerous chore. These efforts,
however, have run into considerable opposition by those fighting yesterday's
battles.
Since the early victories of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, laws
regulating behavior in public have been viewed with extreme suspicion as threats
to the constitutional rights of individuals. Many of the cases from this era were
reactions to the use of older laws to harass or discriminate against particular
1. West Hollywood, Cal., Mun. Code § 4801; Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 15.48.040.
2. "The tolerance, the room for great differences among neighbors, are possible and normal
only when the streets of great cities have built-in equipment allowing strangers to dwell in peace
together on civilized but essentially dignified and reserved terms." Fred Siegel, Reclaiming Our
Public Spaces, 2 City J. 35, 35 (1992).
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(often racial) minority groups.3 Indeed, these cases were successful in removing
many of the arbitrary, discriminatory, and oppressive laws (and law enforcement
practices) of the past, creating equality of opportunity for formerly oppressed
groups.
These cases, which helped end American apartheid, were then used to try to
trump many legitimate community interests, and to elevate all kinds of individual
desires into assertions of rights. They are now used to defend the colonization
of parks by people wishing to sleep there, to assert a right to sleep and eat in the
public place of one's choosing, and to beg in any way one pleases. Consequent-
ly, the jurisprudence of the last three decades has "emphasized individual liberty
over communal security, privilege over responsibility, self-expression over
restraint, and egalitarianism over meritocracy."4 Nowhere is this more true then
where civil liberties claims interfere with the setting of minimal, uniform
standards of public conduct.
In the absence of such standards, many citizens and community groups have
begun to ask whether their cities have experienced a breakdown of social order,
and whether anything can be done about it.5 Unlike previous calls for public
order, which often came from racially homogenous upper classes, current
demands for public civility come from "people of all races wanting to walk
streets or ride buses without feeling under constant siege by others asserting their
'rights' to say anything or behave any way they wish."
6
Maintaining public order, like regulating land use and keeping public spaces
usable and attractive, are traditional functions of government.7 Having learned
the valuable lessons of the past, grass-roots organizations and city governments
have rejected the notion, hinted at or insisted upon by some civil libertarians and
homeless advocates, that a tolerance for diversity must mean a rejection of all
standards of public conduct. Slowly, individuals, community groups, law
enforcement officers, and politicians are coming to see that maintenance of order
in public spaces "lies at the heart of the tension between individual freedom and
communal security."' It would be ironic if the courts permitted the government
to regulate all sorts of beneficial commercial activity, including street vendors,
3. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S. Ct. 935 (1969); Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S. Ct. 242 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S. Ct. 879 (1965);
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 85 S. Ct. 384 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 83 S. Ct. 680 (1963).
4. George L. Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for Order: The Community and Police, 33 Crime
& Delinq. 90, 92 (1987).
5. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 302 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging "the disorder inherently associated with ... this form of
expression").
6. Kelling, supra note 4, at 93-94.
7. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974); People v. Trantham. 161 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 1, 13-14 (1984).
. 8. Kelling, supra note 4, at 92.
1993]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
but declared that begging-trading nothing for money-is constitutionally
protected and not subject to control or regulation.
This article first explains the consequences of begging to the vitality of
urban communities. It also describes the historical approaches to panhandling,
from the Middle Ages to the present. It then discusses the judicial response to
panhandling controls, and sets forth a balanced and constitutional approach to the
problem. Hopefully, this article will contribute to the re-establishment of safety
and civility in urban public spaces.
B. The Extent of The Problem
People in cities are confronted by beggars every day. A walk down a major
urban street will usually mean being asked for money numerous times. Sitting
on a park bench or at an outdoor restaurant can mean holding court to a steady
stream of people hustling change. Some panhandlers ply their trade passively,
merely making a request, or holding a cup with coins in it. Some are more
aggressive, making loud and sometimes repeated demands, or following
pedestrians down the street. Many beg where solicitations are particularly
intimidating, such as at ATMs and (to motorists) at red lights. Others will touch,
shove, or respond with hostility or bigotry if one declines to give money.
The problem is not the man who forgot to bring enough change for the bus.
It is also not the Salvation Army volunteer collecting money for charity at
Christmas time. It is also not the person who is really down and out on her luck,
appealing to our sense of charity and tithing in an unobtrusive manner. The
proposal made in this article is designed to allow these activities to continue.
Rather, aggressive begging, which creates numerous, and very real, social harms,
is the primary focus of this article.
One of the consequences of aggressive begging is a loss of empathy for the
homeless, or, perhaps, for poor people in general. Indeed, the fear engendered
by aggressive beggars often results in a certain amount of callousness towards
the needy as a whole, and contributes to "compassion fatigue." 9
C. The Threat to the Community
Public streets are among cities' greatest assets. The streets provide not only
the transportation, but the vitality, attraction, and interaction in a city. A
willingness to walk on and use the streets is essential to businesses, and to the
life of a city.
9. See, e.g., Nancy R. Gibbs, Begging: To Give or Not to Give, Time, Sept. 5, 1988, at 68
(quoting a Manhattan panhandler who complained that "[gletting money is rough ... because the
crackheads are taking over . . ."). One Seattle panhandler, when asked his reaction to that city's anti-
aggressive begging ordinance, responded that he felt aggressive beggars should be "run off," because
"they give us others a bad name." Associated Press, Seattle Enforces Begging Law, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 26, 1987, at 10, col. 3.
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City parks and sidewalks were built to be community meeting places, where
people of different races, religions, ethnic groups, socio-economic levels, and
political views, could come together and share in the benefits of public spaces.
These venues are places of integration, assimilation, mixture of social classes,
and a counterweight to the increasing fragmentation of society.
These social catalysts only exist, however, if public spaces are seen as
desirable and attractive. When parks or sidewalks are a place of frequent
intimidation and intrusion, they become a place not to be sought out, but to be
avoided. People come to think twice about eating their lunch at the local park
or square, or taking a walk to the zoo, the library, or the comer store.
Exhaustion from having to run a gauntlet of obstacles when using any public
place, "locks neighbors behind doors, chases store owners off streets, shuts down
businesses, and spreads poverty and despair."'"
Millions of people have already expressed themselves on this issue with their
feet, as well as their moving vans, by leaving cities without a tax base, and
communities without public gathering places. As the experiences of Philadel-
phia, Washington, and Detroit have shown, if the cities become unbearable, many
people will relocate to more peaceful surroundings. Urban cores are then left to
a few affluent people living in trendy condominiums, those seeking cohesion
with a minority group, and those dependent upon the government, or illegal
activity, for survival."
D. The Threat to Individuals
In addition to the harms to the community, aggressive begging is also a
source of fear and intimidation for individuals. The fears created by beggars are
neither irrational nor over-estimated. 2 The number of people on the street has
grown significantly in recent years. The reason for this growth may be the
deinstitutionalization of mentally ill persons, or a loosening of the support
network that used to be provided by friends and families. Perhaps. it is due to
excessive government regulation which tends to discourage entrants into the low-
income housing market. For example, rent control, code requirements, and
Byzantine eviction procedures all produce this effect. Another possible reason
is the increased number of people that abuse alcohol and drugs.
10. See George L. Kelling, Measuring What Matters: A New Way of Thinking About Crime
and Public Order, 2 City J. 21, 21 (1992).
11. Lack of public civility contributes to the fear and insecurity that "are consistently among
the top two or three reasons cited by New Yorkers who say they want to leave town." Id.
12. "The most aggressive and abusive of the city's beggars often appear to be strung out on
drugs; pedestrians hand over money in order to pass by in safety, a kind of street toll that comes at
the expense of the genuinely needy." Gibbs, supra note 9, at 72; see also Loper v. New York City
Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993)
(begging's effects range from "mere annoyance and inconvenience to genuine terror").
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Perhaps due to the increasing number of people making their living and bed
on the streets, fear and the threat of violence has become a commonplace
component of begging. Besides the intrusion inherent in accosting a person to
pressure her into giving money, recent episodes between beggars and their targets
demonstrate that a panhandler may be willing to back up requests for money
with more severe measures.1
3
Incidents of aggressive begging have resulted in acts of violence against life
and property.14 Seattle's ordinance prohibiting aggressive begging was passed
specifically "under pressure from downtown business interests and members of
the public who said they were fed up with escalating intimidation and occasional
violence among the city's large street population.""
Such fear is not engendered by the homeless in general, nor even by those
who peacefully solicit alms without accosting passersby. Only the beggar who
intrudes upon an individual's freedom of movement and personal privacy
provokes such a sense of threat. As Seattle Mayor Charles Royer noted, "It
became clear that while we have some people who are hurting, there are some
who are hurting us.,'
6
Beyond the immediate intimidation, aggressive begging can be "part of a
self-perpetuating cycle of decay" drawing more serious crimes into a neighbor-
hood.'7 Having studied the effects on neighborhoods of such disorderly
behavior as begging, Professors James Q. Wilson and George Kelling concluded
that "[j]ust as unrepaired broken windows in buildings may signal that nobody
cares and lead to additional vandalism and damage, so untended disorderly
behavior may also communicate that nobody cares (or that nobody can or will
do anything about disorder) and thus lead to increasingly aggressive criminal and
dangerous predatory behavior."'" Scholars announced a theory that has become
known as the "Broken Windows" effect. 19
Because aggressive panhandling threatens personal security, and contributes
to the "Broken Windows" effect, it must be regulated in order to maintain
attractive and secure public spaces.
13. See Begging Off; Humane Ways to Set Limits, Newsday, February 1, 1990, at 68; Gibbs,
supra note 9, at 69.
14. See, e.g., Begging Off, supra note 13, at 68 (referring to Rodney Sumter, who killed an
aggressive panhandler who had threatened his son).
15. Terry Finn, Seattle's New Panhandling Law in Effect, UPI, Nov. 19, 1987; see also Gibbs,
supra note 9, at 69 (referring to the death of a Seattle man who was beaten to death after allegedly
rebuffing a panhandler).
16. Gibbs, supra note 9, at 74.
17. Kelling, supra note 10, at 28.
18. Kelling, supra note 4. at 93.
19. See also Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aft'd 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[r]eality and everyday experience confirm this 'Broken
Windows' Effect").
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E. Three Paths From Here
The solution to these urban problems, including the "Broken Windows"
effect, can be reached only to the extent that people continue to care about urban
centers, and deem them worth saving and improving. While society may not be
able to regain the lower crime rates of decades past, hope of regaining a
modicum of serenity and security in urban centers should not be lost. This goal
is not only consistent with, but relies upon, a vision of urban spaces where
integration and tolerance is expected.
There are three choices to the growing problem of urban incivility. First,
people can surrender the streets to those who would prevent reasonable and
unobstructed access. This would allow everyone "to let it all hang out" and do
as they please, using the sidewalks as their stage, and the few people who dare
to venture into town as their involuntary audience. In other words, people can
sit idly by while social interaction in public grinds to a standstill, property values
decrease, segregation and isolation increases, and crime increases.
The second choice is to listen to the ham-fisted authoritarians and revert to
the 1950s laws against loitering and vagrancy. These laws were subject to
discriminatory and arbitrary application and were particularly used against racial
minorities. The abuses under these laws were widespread, leading the Supreme
Court, with considerable justification, to strike many of them down. It is no
answer to the current situation to once again grant the police unfettered discretion
to approach, question, and harass anyone they, or the majority, do not like.
The third choice represents a middle way. A thoughtful, considerate,
balanced approach involves carefully tailored legislation that is aimed precisely
at the real problems on our streets and our communities. This approach operates
from the belief that what stands between a surrender of public spaces and a
caring, responsive, and vibrant community is a willingness to allow communities
a modicum of safety, civility, and serenity on their streets, sidewalks, and parks.
One place to begin is the protection of pedestrians from unwanted solicitations,
harassments, and assault.
The moderate approach can be taken without having to first address long-
standing sociological problems. Making it easier and more pleasant to walk
down an urban street does not require ambitious new social programs. It
requires only well-tailored legislation that defines both begging and accosting in
a manner that prohibits only the behaviors that present a real threat to the safety
and sensibilities of a reasonable person. The effort should avoid the excesses of
the past and have a solid constitutional foundation.20  Such an approach is
20. Legislation aimed at unwelcome panhandling is a key element in returning safety and
civility to urban streets. Other measures being tried with success, but also routinely challenged by
radical individualists, include anti-drug loitering ordinances, regulations of the locale of public
sleeping, asset seizures for drug and prostitution customers, and limitations on the public consumption
of alcohol. All of these efforts have in common an effort to strengthen communities and make the
streets safe so that community life can flourish.
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entirely consistent with compassionate treatment of the homeless. It seems
hardly helpful to the homeless to feed addictions, to financially encourage life
on the street, or to declare a "right" to freeze to death without help. What the
homeless appear to need is hospitalization for severe mental illnesses and
substance abuse rehabilitation.1
Annoying solicitations may be beyond complete eradication, but if these
behaviors can be kept within defined limits, made more discreet, and less
intrusive, law-abiding people can regain control over their public spaces, and
walk down the street in peace. The process of reversing the lawlessness, the
discomfort, and the lack of civility of recent years begins with an attention to
one of the goals of the federal Constitution: to ensure domestic tranquility.
II. SOME HISTORY
Current efforts to regulate begging, far from being a unique or unusual
limitation on public conduct, are merely the latest in a long line of anti-begging
measures stretching back to the earliest civilizations. Nevertheless, the purposes
of these laws have evolved through the ages.
A. A Crucial Difference
The anti-aggressive begging ordinances of recent years present a marked
difference from preceding laws in that they aim not to remove the poor from
public view, but merely to prohibit the actions of beggars that inhibit use of
public spaces. While older laws were aimed at punishing the laggard and the
lazy, the current measures are aimed at enabling the community to enjoy
unimpeded passage through safe public spaces.
Ancient anti-begging laws were based on the view that any unproductive
member of society was a threat to the health of the community as a whole.
Thus, the man who could work, but chose not to, could be enslaved or otherwise
impelled to labor. In feudal Europe, begging came to be seen as a symptom of
vagrancy, that is to say, of being outside the feudal order. The justification for
retaining vagrancy laws, after the decay of the feudal system, eventually came
to focus on the belief that those without a consistent means of support were a
dangerous class, likely to commit criminal acts. This was the basis of vagrancy
laws in the United States until they were struck down by the federal courts as
unconstitutional two decades ago.22
21. See generally Alice Baum and David Bums, A Nation in Denial: The Truth About
Homelessness (1993).
22. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,92 S. Ct. 839 (1972); Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S. Ct. 935 (1969).
The "potential danger" presented by vagabonds has not disappeared as a concern, either by those
who defend anti-begging measures in court, or by politicians. For example, a Miami Assistant City
Attorney said that the city could not "close [its] eyes to the fact that there are criminal elements in
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Modem ordinances seeking to control intrusive panhandling are part of a
newer class of public conduct measures passed in response to the United States
Supreme Court's rejection of "mere loitering laws" and similar attacks of
"vagrancy." The older loitering laws largely prohibited the mere act of
wandering and were derived from the medieval English laws aimed at controlling
unemployed and fugitive serfs.23 Often, these laws criminalized a person's
status by making it an offense simply to be a beggar, gambler, drunkard, or
prostitute.24
The Supreme Court's objection to the older style of "mere loitering" laws
was clear: harmless activity engaged in by people lacking any illicit intentions
had been made criminal. Thus, the old laws could apply to mere strollers and
star-gazers, activities which were "historically part of the amenities of life as we
know them.,
25
These concerns, and these abuses, are a far cry from the efforts to protect
the public from over-reaching by persons who ask money on the streets. Anti-
aggressive begging ordinances leaves behind the innocent activities and
generalized laws that were struck down in Papachristou, and are part of a new
generation of laws aimed at those who engage in specific, harmful conduct.
The modem anti-begging laws differ from the older, unconstitutional statutes
in at least three marked ways. First, they are aimed at an activity, and thus do
not criminalize the defendant's status. Although there may be a right to be a
vagabond, there is no constitutional right to aggressively panhandle, or to be free
from government regulation of a particular trade. 26 Second, the activities that
the ordinances seek to curtail, like assaults, are within the government's
legitimate regulatory interest. Third, the ordinances do not provide unfettered
discretion to the police to pick and choose whom to arrest. Rather, the laws
proscribe specific conduct, which must be found in order to sustain arrest and
conviction."
Valuable lessons can be learned from the older European approaches to
begging. First, the Europeans believed that communities had some social
the homeless community," to justify arresting people who had been sleeping in parks and under
freeways. Beth Duff-Brown, Associated Press Wire (June 20, 1992).
The justification for controls on aggressive begging is presented in more detail both in the
introductory section of this paper and in my defense of the constitutionality of these measures.
23. Id.; cf. James F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 226-75 (1883).
24. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions oil the Punishment of
Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the
Like, 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205, 205 (1967).
25. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Burton, 478 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1972) (striking down ordinance
prohibiting wandering about the streets in the nighttime or frequenting places of public resort by lewd
women, etc.); Arthur H. Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 557, 559-601 (1960).
26. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,75 S. Ct. 461 (1955); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
27. Cf State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975).
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obligation to those within their community. Second, they drew distinctions
between those truly needy and those able to work. Third, they saw a particular
harm in more aggressive forms of panhandling. Finally, they saw that
panhandling inhibited community development and cohesiveness.
This history is presented below to distinguish the current efforts from the
more sweeping measures of the past, but also to demonstrate that the current
efforts are part of a long tradition of community efforts to maintain safety and
civility in public spaces. Like the highwayman, carjacker, open-air drug dealer,
or the street prostitute, the aggressive beggar has been a long-standing problem
for law-abiding people seeking a healthy and pleasant community.
B. An Ancient Prohibition
Societies have regulated begging throughout history. The earliest European
court of which there is literary record, the Areopagus of classical Athens, set out
to determine how citizens spent their time. Those who had lived off of alms
were punished.28 Thus, from the earliest western civilizations, society conclud-
ed that the beggar contributed nothing positive to a community, and actually
interfered with the rights and productivity of others.
The idealized laws of Plato contain a provision for the exile of beggars.2
Reasoning that, in a state run in accordance with his laws, there would be no
need or good reason for begging, Plato would order that:
"no one is to go begging in the state [and that] anyone who attempts to
do so, and scrounges a living by never-ending importunities, must be
expelled from the market by the Market-Wardens, from the city by the
City-Wardens, and from the surrounding country by the Country-
Wardens. Beggars were sent across the border, so that the land may rid
itself completely of such a creature.,
3 0
Roman law laid down very detailed procedures for dealing with beggars, but
declined to impose an absolute ban. As such, it may have been the first system
to distinguish between those beggars who could not physically make a living
except through begging alms and those who were healthy, but chose to live
through panhandling. The law codified during the reign of the Emperor Justinian
provided that a person who discovered and reported a fit beggar should acquire
that beggar as his property if the beggar was a slave, or as his permanent serf if
the beggar was a free man.3 ' The Novels of Justinian, which extended the law
to the eastern capital of Constantinople, required that beggars' bodies be
28. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 169 (9th ed. 1783) (citing
2 Valerius Maximus, chapter 6).
29. Plato, The Laws, 11.90.
30. Id.
31. Code J. 11.26(25).1.
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examined to see whether they were fit for work.32 If the beggar was fit and he
was a slave, he was to be sent back to his owner; if he was free, but not a
citizen of the capital, he was to be ordered to return to the province whence he
had come; if he was a local inhabitant, he was assigned to the public works, and
if he refused to work, he was to be exiled.33
These measures, which may sound peculiar or cruel to our contemporaries,
represent an early conclusion that the problem with beggars is that they choose
to provide for themselves financially without a contribution to the economic
system. These societies rejected the parasite, and saw the issue as motivating the
laggard to pursue productive work and self-sufficiency.
C. "The Begging Drones": The English Approach to Panhandling
These traditions carried over to the Middle Ages. Our legal forbearers, the
English, seemed to feel quite strongly about the problems that beggars presented
to their community. The first English law to deal specifically with begging
prescribed the death penalty for anyone who gave anything to a beggar able to
work, and required all unemployed able-bodied beggars under sixty years of age
to serve anyone who required their service.' By the latter half of the four-
teenth century, begging became a regulated behavior. In 1388, an elaborate
statute was passed which required that "beggars impotent to serve shall abide in
the cities and towns where they be dwelling at the time of the proclamation of
this statute .... ,3 Presumably, the English believed that beggars should rely
on their home communities, but not burden strangers.
As the urban centers of England became more populous, regulation of
begging became more intricate. A statute enacted in 1530, keeping the emphasis
on a person's attachment to his or her community, ordered that the disabled poor
be licensed to beg within their own local area. 6 Those begging outside the
permitted area were to spend two days and nights in the stocks, and fed only
bread and water. Moreover, anyone begging without a license was to be
whipped and those "whole and mighty in body, able to labor" were to be "tied
to the end of a cart naked, and be beaten with whips throughout the same town
or other place till his body be bloody by reason of such whipping.""
This sanguinary law was amended in 1535 to provide assistance to those
who were truly needy, and to guide the others towards productive work. Under
32. Nov. 80.4-5 (535).
33. Id.
34. Statute of Laborers, 23 Edw. 3, St. 1, ch. 7 (1349).
35. Stephen, supra note 23, at 268-69 (quoting 12 Rich. 2, ch. 7). These early statutes were
part of the vagrancy law which developed in late medieval England to retard the decay of the feudal
system and discourage the desertion of serfs. Laws dealing with not living in one's proper home,
i.e. vagrancy, date back to the time of Hlothwere and Eadric in the seventh century.
36. 22 Hen. 8, ch. 12.
37. Stephen, supra note 23, at 269-70.
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the amendment, sturdy beggars were made to work, and invalids were supported
by alms collected by the churchwardens and two others of every parish.38 This
was the first English law to legislate charitable sustenance of the poor.
After the accession to the throne of King Edward, the Henrician laws were
replaced by more severe measures. The Edwardian statute provided that any
loiterer or wanderer who would not work, or had run away from work, was to
be branded with a "V" for vagabond.39 Furthermore, he was to be a slave for
two years to whomever demanded him, was to be fed bread and water, and
forced to do any task "how vile soever it be as he shall be put unto by beating,
chaining, or otherwise."'  Moreover, if the enslaved beggar ran away, he was
to be branded with an "S" upon the cheek and made a slave for life. If he ran
away again, he was to be hanged.4'
The statute of Edward VI was probably enacted to deal with the large
number of laborers who were on the streets and byways, having lost their
employment during the persecution of Catholics during the Reformation. This
severe vagrancy statute proved difficult to enforce and presumably aroused strong
opposition. It lasted only two years before being repealed, 42 and the old acts
of Henry VIII were reenacted.4 a
During the reign of Queen Mary, more detailed laws were enacted regarding
the number of begging licenses to be issued and the organized collection of alms
for the poor.'
The early part of Elizabeth's reign once more saw chaos resulting from the
anti-Protestant purges of Queen Mary and the anti-Catholic reaction. Conse-
quently, in 1572, Parliament enacted a harsh provision which required that all
beggars be "grievously whipped and burned through the gristle of the right ear"
for a first offense, and held guilty of a felony for a second offense.45
In 1597, all previous laws concerning beggars and vagrants were repealed
in favor of a statute which would remain in force for over a century.' The
new law still recognized the problem as getting able people to work, but offered
assistance to this class of people (not charity). In accordance with the 1597 act,
counties were required to build houses of correction, where "rogues, vagabonds,
and sturdy beggars" were to be kept until they were put to work or banished.47
Those persons found begging were to "be stripped naked from the middle
upwards, and be openly whipped until his body be bloody" and then sent to the
38. 27 Hen. 8, ch. 25 (cited in Stephen, supra note 23, at 270-71).
39. 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) (cited in Stephen, supra note 23, at 271).
40. Id
41. Id.
42. 3 & 4 Edw. 6, ch. 16 (1549).
43. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 2 (1552).
44. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ch. 5 (1555).
45. 14 Eliz. ch. 5 (1572) (quoted in Stephen, supra note 23, at 272).
46. 39 Eliz. ch. 4 (1597) (cited in Stephen, supra note 23, at 272).
47. Id.
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house of correction in his birthplace.4" The Elizabethan statute was a catch-all,
and included among those defined as rogues and vagabonds not only "idle
persons going about ... begging," but also fortune-tellers, jugglers, minstrels,
and "common laborers, able in body and refusing to work for the wages
commonly given."
'4 9
The latter inclusion underlines the fact that the early vagrancy statutes were
used to keep laborers with their local employer in a period of increasing
transiency. According to John Locke, poverty and begging were not the result
of "scarcity of provisions or want of employment," but rather "the relaxation of
discipline and the corruption of manners, virtue, and industry."50 Locke, when
serving as Commissioner of Trade, attempted to address the problem of "the
begging drones." His plan included stiff penalties for those who begged without
a license, including sending men to sea, hard labor, and sentences to the House
of Correction.5
The Statute of 1597 was slightly modified in 1713 with a provision
authorizing justices to commit incorrigible rogues to a seven-year period as
servants or apprentices in Britain or the colonies.5 2
In 1744, the long list of vagrants covered by previous laws was divided into
idle and disorderly persons, rogues and vagabonds, and incorrigible rogues.5 3
The act specified, in minute detail, procedures and punishments for each class.54
Able-bodied persons who supported themselves by begging in their own locality
were held to be idle and disorderly, and were imprisoned for one month with
hard labor.55 Those who panhandled outside their own parish were classified
as rogues and could be imprisoned for up to six months, while repeat offenders
were deemed incorrigible rogues and subject to imprisonment for two years.56
The 1744 act was the law of England when the Continental Congress declared
its independence.
In England, the focus of vagrancy law changed from motivating unproduc-
tive members of society to work, to preventing crime, thus ushering in the
second genre of anti-begging measures.57 The Vagrancy Act of 1824,58 which
is still in force in the United Kingdom, extended the definition of rogues and
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Maurice Cranston, John Locke: A Biography 424 (1985) (quoted in Loper v. New York
City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aftd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993)).
51. Id.
52. 12 Anne, st. 2, ch. 23 (1713).
53. 17 Geo. 2, ch. 5 (1744) (cited in Stephen, supra note 35, at 73).




57. Nonetheless, vagrancy and idleness were still described as "offenses against the public
economy." 3 Henry J. Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws of England 309 (1844).
58. 5 Geo. 4. ch. 83 (1824).
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vagabonds to include loiterers intending to commit crimes, reputed thieves, those
possessing thieves' tools, and other potential criminals.5 By 1883, Sir James
F. Stephen remarked that:
These provisions have been so much extended by more recent legisla-
tion, that it may now be almost stated as a general proposition, that any
person of bad character who prowls about, apparently for an unlawful
purpose, is liable to be treated as a rogue and vagabond. 6
This statement highlights another difference between the Vagrancy Act of 1824
and earlier legislation. The more recent law, which focused on having an
unlawful purpose for loitering, punished people not on the basis of status alone,
but on the basis of status and some specified (actual or imputed) intent.6'
D. In Scotland
Scottish law developed along similar lines to English law, though usually
somewhat later. This lag in the development of laws regulating begging is
probably due to the slower decay of feudalism in Scotland, which had been the
impetus for the earliest vagrancy laws in England. Also, after the Act of Union,
less importance was attached to the governance of Scotland than of England.
Scotland began with a licensing approach. The first Scottish statute to limit
begging forbade anyone between the ages of fourteen and seventy to beg, unless
provided with a permit by the sheriff or bailie. 62 At the turn of the sixteenth
century, the sheriffs discretion was limited so that only the "crooked, blind,
impotent, and weak" were allowed to beg. 63 Thus, Scottish society's tolerance
for the panhandler was limited to those unable to provide for themselves.
These provisions for locally-issued begging permits were the backbone of
the Scottish approach to the problem until the unified vagrancy laws of the
Hanoverian kings in the eighteenth century. Some detail had been added under
Charles II, including a provision allowing sheriffs and bailies to compel able-
bodied beggars to work,' and requiring the construction of correction houses
for beggars.65
59. Id. (cited in Stephen, supra note 35, at 273-74).
60. Stephen, supra note 23, at 274.
61. See Ledwith v. Roberts, 3 All E.R. 570, 579 (1936).
62. Jac. 1, ch. 21 (1424).
63. Jac. 4, ch. 14 (1503). These laws were actually earlier than the corresponding measure in
English law during the reign of Henry VIII and may have inspired it.
64. Car. 2, ch. 161 (1649).
65. Car. 2, ch. 42 (1672).
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E. In Other Parts of Europe
On the continent, the Roman law of Justinian was accepted until the
codifications of the nineteenth century. The current French Code Pnal, as
amended from the Code P6nal of 1832, distinguishes between those who
associate for criminal purposes (associations de malfaiteurs), vagrants (vaga-
bonds), and beggars (mendicants).'
The French have incorporated a strong sense of social obligation into their
law. Strikingly, those who beg in an area which has no public establishment for
the aid of the poor are not punished by the Code.67 Beggars in areas which
provide such an establishment, however, are to be imprisoned for three to six
months, and then taken to the poorhouse (ddp6t de mendicite).68
The French shared the English concern with wandering beggars. Even
where there was a public charitable establishment, habitual and sturdy beggars
(mendicants d'habitudes valides) were to be punished with one to three months
of imprisonment and, if they were arrested outside their canton of legal
residence, were punished by six months to two years of imprisonment. 69
The French were the first to put controls on aggressive or misleading
begging. Article 276 of the Code imprisons for six months to two years any
beggar (including the handicapped) who begs on private property without
permission of the owner, or feigns illness or infirmity, or begs in a group, unless
the group consists of a husband and wife, parent and child, or blind person and
the person who leads him.70 Moreover, beggars or vagrants found in possession
of weapons or thieves' tools are subject to two to five years in prison,7 and a
beggar or vagrant in possession of any item over one franc in value (approxi-
mately 22 cents) whose provenance cannot be explained is subject to six months
to two years.72 These measures laid the groundwork for laws that identify and
prohibit more intrusive types of begging. Furthermore, other civil-law systems
have generally modeled their anti-begging laws on those of France," though
many have now abrogated those laws.74
66. See C. pn. Arts. 265-82 (Dalloz 24th ed. at 172-76 (1986-87)). Vagrants are defined as
"those who have neither certain domicile, nor means of subsistence, and who are not regularly
employed." Or, "ceux qui n'ont ni domicile certain, ni moyens de subsistence, et qui n'exercent
habituellement ni mtier, ni profession" Id. Art. 270.
67. See Crim. 24 ao0t et 24 nov. 1893, D.P. 96. 1. 430; 6 sept. 1894 et 18 oct. 1895, O.P. 96.
1. 430; 16 mars 1899, D.P. 1900. 5. 435.
68. C. pn. Art 274.
69. C. pn. Art. 275.
70. C. pn. Art. 276.
71. C. pn. Art. 277.
72. C. pn. Art. 278.
73. See, e.g., Danish Criminal Code, ch. 22, Arts. 197-98 (G.E.C. Gad 1958).
74. See, e.g., StGB § 361; EGStGB vom 2.3.1974 (Germany).
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Communist legal systems originally did not criminalize begging or vagrancy
because, as the state would offer universal employment, no one should have to
beg for a living (or, perhaps, since the poor and destitute could not exist in the
workers paradise, there was no need to include them in the law). By 1960,
however, even the Supreme Soviet recognized that some Russians would prefer
to beg rather than work for the state, and accordingly passed an act forbidding
"systematically engaging in vagrancy or in begging, continued after warning
given by administrative agencies. 75
In sum, westerners have historically and consistently sought to prevent, or
at least control, begging. These societies recognized the negative community
consequences of begging, and took corrective action to drive those beggars
capable of work to more productive forms of making a living. They were
especially concerned with beggars outside of their home communities, and with
those beggars who presented a threat to the safety and security of others.76
F. The Lewd, the Disorderly, and the Dissolute: Begging Controls in Early
America
The first effort of the newly independent United States to control beggars
and vagrants was to deny them all rights. The nascent United States accom-
plished this by excepting them from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Articles of Confederation:
The free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several States, and the people of each
State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State."
No such exception appeared in the Constitution of 1787. To the extent that the
framers of the Constitution were conscious of the subject, it can probably be
assumed that they intended that the matter be left to the control of the states.
The states did, in fact, take up the gauntlet. By 1956, vagrancy statutes were in
force in every state except West Virginia, where it was a common-law crime.78
75. UK RSFSR Art. 209 (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 1960), in Soviet Criminal
Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes 59, 224 (H. Berman & J. Spindler trans. 1966).
76. To limit both space and our comparisons to those nations with similar legal systems, we
have not discussed panhandling laws outside of Europe. However, the problem and attempts at
legislative solutions are not limited to western civilization. Even in India, where begging is a Hindu
rite, there is a legislative initiative to control what is perceived as a growing problem of aggressive
panhandling. See Vijay Joshi, Anti-Begging Law Defies Hindu Tradition, Los Angeles Times, Dec.
13, 1992, at 39.
77. Articles of Confederation, Art. IV (quoted in Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 616 n.33 (1956)).
78. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 609
(1956).
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Massachusetts's vagrancy statute of 1788"' was closely patterned on the
English law in effect at the time, and used the same classification of idle and
disorderly persons, rogues and vagabonds, and incorrigible rogues. Other states
appear to have based their definition of vagrants on the Elizabethan law of
1597, 80 with its condemnation of jugglers, minstrels, idlers, etc. An eighteenth
century New York law classified as disorderly "all persons who go about from
door to door or place themselves in the streets, highways, or passages, to beg in
the cities and towns.'
The vagrancy statutes of states which later entered the union were usually
based on those of the older states, although the newer states may have added
prohibited classes to the list. For instance, the offense of being a "common
drunkard" was unknown in the common law, but was included in most state
vagrancy statutes by the end of the nineteenth century. 2
A common feature of these state statutes was a prohibition of beggars or
begging. One typical measure, from California's statute of 1872, prohibited
"[e]very beggar who solicits alms as a business." 3 This provision is still in
force, though it has been amended to prohibit "accost[ing] other persons in any
public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of begging or
soliciting alms."'
Until the 1960s and the initiatives of the Supreme Court, vagrancy laws were
generally upheld by state courts. The Washington Supreme Court, for instance,
upheld a statute which condemned "[e]very person who is a lewd, disorderly, or
dissolute person."85 The Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague as "[t]he constitutional right of due process of law will not be given such
effect as will render impossible laws which are generally admitted to be essential
to the safety and well-being of society. ' 6 The Court emphasized the impor-
tance of the vagrancy statute in dramatic terms: "Society recognizes that
vagrancy is a parasitic disease, which, if allowed to spread, will sap the life of
that upon which it feeds. 8 7 The state courts, even more than federal courts,
reflected this view well into.the 1960s.
79. Mass. St. 1788, ch. 21.
80. 39 Eliz., ch. 4 (1597).
81. See Sherry, supra note 25, at 558-61.
82. See id. at 563.
83. Cal. Penal Code § 647(2) (West 1977).
84. Cal. Penal Code § 647(c) (West 1977). This statute cannot be enforced under a permanent
injunction issued by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California. Blair v.
Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991). At the time of this writing, the case was on appeal
to the Ninth Circuit. See Blair v. Shanahan, Nos. 92-15447, 92-15459, 92-15451 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. State v. Harlowe, 24 P.2d 601, 602 (1933).




III. SURVEY OF CURRENT LEGISLATION
A. State Codes
Twenty-six states now have laws concerning begging. Eleven states merely
authorize municipalities to proscribe begging. 8 Other states have maintained
absolute provisions on begging, although apparently no state rigidly enforces
such a provision.
The Criminal Code of Kansas prohibits "deriving support in whole or in part
from begging."8 9 Massachusetts, still maintaining some of the structure of the
English statute of 1744, includes those wandering from place to place in order
to beg in the definitions of both "tramps ' 90 and "vagrants. 9'g  Under Michigan
law, "a person found begging in a public place" is a "disorderly person." 92
Minnesota's vagrancy statute93 includes in its definition of vagrancy not only
"deriv[ing] one's support in whole or in part from begging," but also such
Elizabethan practices as fortune-telling or being a "similar imposter." Wisconsin
appears to share Minnesota's concern, in that it specifically prohibits "deriv[ing]
part of [one's] support from begging or as a fortune teller or similar impos-
ter."94 Vermont's statute exempts the truly destitute, prohibiting only beggars
who have no other visible means of support.95 Louisiana and Mississippi retain
the civil law's distinction between able-bodied and disabled beggars, punishing
only the former.
%
Many of the state laws currently on the books could be described as "status
crimes," because they prohibit being something, rather than doing something.
Several other states have some sort of variation on begging prohibitions. Five
other states forbid loitering for the purpose of begging.97
88. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-1408 (Michie 1987); I11. Rev. Stat., ch. 24,$ 11-5-4 (1989); Mont.
Code Ann. §--7-32-4304 (1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 15-257 (1987); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:17
(1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-179 (1982); N.D. Cent. Code § 40-05-01(43) (1989); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 715.55B (Baldwin 1989); Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-51 (1990); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
35.22.280(34) (West 1990); Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-103(a)(xvii) (1990).
89. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4108(e) (1988).
90. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 63 (1988).
91. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, § 66 (1988).
92. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.167(1)(h) (West 1990).
93. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.725(4) (West 1990).
94. Wise. Stat. Ann. § 947.02(4) (West 1988).
95. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3901 (1989).
96. La. R.S. 14:107(3) (1986); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-37 (1972).
97. Ala. Code § 13A-11-9(a)(1) (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2905(A)(3) (1990); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 18-9-112(2)(a) (1986); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1321(4) (1990); N.Y. Penal Law §
240.35(1) (McKinney 1989). The New York law was ruled unconstitutional in Loper v. New York
City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). The Arizona law was upheld in State ex rel.
Williams v. City of Tuscon, 520 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
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Finally, the aforementioned California statute limits violations to persons
who "accost" others for the purpose of begging, thereby limiting its application
to aggressive and coercive approaches by beggars. The state statute represented
a conscious attempt to address what was perceived as the problem of panhan-
dling, while still reforming the old vagrancy laws. 98
Hawaii has followed California's lead. Its disorderly conduct statute, based
on California's section 647, more specifically punishes an individual if, "with
intent to cause physical inconvenience or alarm by a member or members of the
public, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he impedes or obstructs, for the
purpose of begging or soliciting alms, any person in any public place or in any
place open to the public."
99
B. The Approach of the Cities
Most of the nation's larger cities have had ordinances prohibiting or limiting
begging in public places. Several cities retain absolute bans on begging,'
°°
although most such ordinances are no longer enforced.' ' A few cities prohibit
begging in specific places.0 2
The most recent genre of anti-panhandling laws moves away from all of the
actual or potential pitfalls of their predecessors. They do not criminalize the
status of being a beggar (or being poor). They do not prohibit innocuous acts
such as wandering or loitering, which may be considered harmless. Of course,
they also forego the more peculiar and stringent punishments of their medieval
ancestors.
Rather, the best of the civic ordinances under consideration or currently in
effect are aimed at the problems of civility and usability of public spaces. They
attempt to reach only the problems of "aggressive begging" and "pedestrian
interference," reaching only conduct which is egregious, dangerous, or intrusive.
One of the earliest of this new genre is Seattle's ordinance forbidding
"aggressively beg[ging]" and "obstruct[ing] pedestrian or vehicular traffic."'0 3
The ordinance defines "aggressively" begging as "begging with the intent to
intimidate another person into giving money or goods."' ' Seattle's ordinance
has been upheld by the Washington Supreme Court.'
98. See 22 Assem. Com. Rep. (1959-1961), No. I., Crim. Procedure, p. 9, 2 Appen. to Assem.
J. (1961 Reg. Session) (California Legislative Records).
99. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1101(l)(e) (1978).
100. Such cities include: Austin, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, Fort Wayne, Lexington, Miami,
Mobile, Newport News, Phoenix, San Francisco, Toledo, and Wichita (in definition of loitering).
101. Only Baltimore and Phoenix made arrests for violations of their begging prohibitions in
1991.
102. Albuquerque (public view); El Paso (in vehicles stopped in the streets at traffic lights);
Indianapolis (streets, parks); New York (subways and airports); San Antonio (airports).
103. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 12A.12.015B (1987).
104. Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 12A.12.015A(l) (1987).
105. See City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1690
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Almost simultaneously with Seattle's ordinance, the city of Portland, Oregon,
passed an act prohibiting "offensive physical contact."' 6 Although the statute
never mentions begging, and limits its prohibition to physical contact, the
Portland ordinance could be applied to aggressive panhandling as it bans
"caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause another person reasonably to apprehend that
they will be subjected to any offensive physical contact either to their person or
to personal property in their immediate possession.'
0 7
In 1988, Minneapolis followed Seattle's lead and passed an ordinance aimed
specifically at "interference with pedestrian or vehicular traffic. '" 8  The
Minneapolis ordinance uses exhaustive language, requiring that:
no person, in any public or private place, shall ... follow or engage in
conduct which reasonably tends to arouse alarm or anger in others, or
walk, stand, sit, lie, or place an object in such a manner as to block
passage by another person or a vehicle, or to require another person or
a driver of a vehicle to take evasive action to avoid physical con-
tact."°
This ordinance is a combination between the Portland and Seattle ordinances.
Several other cities have adopted anti-aggressive begging ordinances,
including Albuquerque, "0  Atlanta,"' Baltimore," 2  Cincinnati,'
3
Dallas," 14 Tulsa," 5 and Washington (D.C.)." 6  Several other cities are also
considering such ordinances, including Jacksonville, Florida (respondent in the
Papachristou decision), Philadelphia, Portland (Maine), Evanston, New York
City, Detroit, Long Beach, and Pittsburgh.
(1991). The ordinance has since been amended by adding a prohibition on lying down on public
sidewalks. See Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 15.48.040.
106. Portland, Or., Mun. Code § 14.24.040(a) (1987).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Minneapolis, Minn., Charter & Code of Ordinances tit. 15, § 385.65 (1988).
109. Id.
110. Albuquerque, N.M., Mun. Code § 12-1-2-7 (1988) ("hindering or molesting persons passing
along," "intentionally obstructing" or "aggressively begging ... if the means are intended to
intimidate another person into giving money or goods").
111. Atlanta, Ga., Code of Ordinances § 17-3006 (1991) ("ask, beg or solicit alms ... by
accosting another or forcing oneself upon another").
112. Baltimore City Code, art. 19. § 249.
113. Cincinnati, Ohio, Mun. Code § 910-13 (1992) ("recklessly interfere with pedestrian or
vehicular traffic").
114. Dallas, Tex., City Code § 31-35 (1991) ("solicitation by coercion," including "persist[ence]
in a solicitation after the person solicited has given a negative response").
115. Tulsa, Okla., Pen. Code § 1407 (1992) ("stop or accost others or direct persons or animals
to stop or accost others ... to ask for money" two or more times within a period of one hour).
116. 22 D.C. Code Ann. § 3311 (1993).
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IV. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: BEGGING CONTROLS IN THE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court's Hints and Guidelines
1. Response to Controls on Vagrancy
There are relatively few American cases dealing with the constitutionality
of regulations on begging. There are several reasons for this lack of jurispru-
dence. First, it has been the exception, rather than the rule, for police officers
to actually arrest beggars. In a recent New York case, the judge, while striking
down a sweeping prohibition of "loitering for the purpose of begging,"
acknowledged that actual arrests for begging were exceedingly rare."' Rather,
the police have usually warned beggars, making it rare for the issue to come to
trial. The warning, or the "move on" order, of course, can do the trick, and
protect the safety and civility of the area.
A second reason is that the roots of vagrancy laws are of such antiquity that,
until recently, they have not been questioned by legislators, civil libertarians, or
beggars.
Finally, during the nineteenth century, the United States was rapidly
expanding both physically and economically while maintaining strong family
structures. Consequently, the United States may have had fewer habitual beggars
as a portion of the population than it has now." 8 Thus, federal courts did not
consider the constitutionality of vagrancy laws until the late 1960s and have only
been faced with the issue of regulation of begging within the last three years.
Today, more people are making their living or supplementing their income by
begging, bringing the issue back to the forefront.
One of the few federal cases of the nineteenth century to mention beggars
concerned an effort by the city of New York to regulate immigrants coming
through the city's port. In Mayor of New York v. Miln," 9 the city fined the
master of a vessel which had brought one hundred passengers into the port
without reporting the passengers' names, ages, and last legal settlements. 20
The Court held, in a decision which was subsequently overturned, that the
exclusion of undesirable immigrants was within the police power of the state,
and was not an unconstitutional attempt to regulate interstate commerce.121
More important than the holding of the Court was its comparison between the
117. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1032, 1036, 1047 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aftid, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
118. "'1 have now been here twenty months and I have only been visited by two beggars'--one
English, one Italian." Paul Johnson, The Birth of the Modem: World Society 1815-1830 53 (1991)
(quoting William Cobbett, Journal of a Year's Residence in the United States of America (1819)).
119. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
120. Id. at 131.
121. Id. at 142.
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exclusion of paupers and beggars to the quarantine of passengers with virulent
diseases:
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide
precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers,
vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical
pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles
imported, or from a ship, the crew of which may be labouring under an
infectious disease.1
22
This sort of inflammatory language was characteristic of discussions of vagrancy
law well into the twentieth century. At that time, though, the focus was not on
safety and civility in public spaces, but on the "moral pestilence."
In 1941, the Supreme Court of the United States considered a case which,
although not concerning an ordinance that directly affected begging, was to have
a major influence on state regulation of activities protected by the First
Amendment. In Cox v. New Hampshire,'23 a group of Jehovah's Witnesses
were convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting any "parade or procession"
on a public street without a license. The plaintiffs argued that, as the parade was
"for the purpose of disseminating information in the public interest," the
licensing provision violated their First Amendment freedoms of speech, religion,
and assembly. The Supreme Court did not agree. 124 The Court noted that the
ministers were charged only for parading and not for such communication as
handing out leaflets or wearing placards. 5 Consequently, the Court upheld
the New Hampshire statute as legitimately restricting the manner of speech. The
Court remarked, in language directly relevant to the current debate, that:
[C]ivil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence
of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty
itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one
of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
depend.'
26
This case was the first to specifically state that cities had the power to regulate
the time, place, and manner of speech in a non-discriminatory fashion. 21  Not
only were such restrictions permissible, they were seen as necessary for ordered
122. Id. at 142-43.
123. 312 U.S. 569, 570-71, 61 S. Ct. 762, 763 (1941).
124. Id. at 573, 61 S. Ct. at 764.
125. Id., 61 S. Ct. at 764.
126. Id. at 574, 61 S. Ct. at 765.
127. Id. at 576, 61 S. Ct. at 766.
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liberty. Current versions of anti-aggressive begging laws follow this principle
and seek to protect the order upon which basic civil liberties depend.
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,'28 the Supreme Court considered
an ordinance which made it an offense to obstruct passage on a street or
sidewalk and to refuse police orders to move on.'29 The Court upheld the
ordinance as constitutional, as long as the police are limited in their discretion
and allowed to issue move-on orders only to persons who are obstructing a
public thoroughfare.
130
In a 1968 case, United States v. O'Brien,'3' the Supreme Court set the
standard for determining the permissible scope of regulation of speech containing
expressive elements. The case arose after the defendants were arrested for
burning their Selective Service registration certificates during the Vietnam
War.'32 The Court found the act in question' constitutional because "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'134
The Court held that such a regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
35
The O'Brien test has remained the standard for restrictions on conduct
containing an expressive component. All four of these elements appear to be
met with anti-aggressive solicitation legislation. Thus, these measures should be
upheld as constitutional even if a court were to find an expressive element in
street begging.' 36
128. 382 U.S. 87, 86 S. Ct. 211 (1965).
129. Id. at 88, 86 S. Ct. at 212.
130. Id. at 90-91, 86 S. Ct. at 213-14. Concurring opinions by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Fortas agreed that, on its face, the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the City's police power,
although they argued that the defendant could not be held guilty on the facts presented. Id. at 95,
86 S. Ct. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 99, 86 S. Ct. at 217 (Brennan, J., concurring); id.
at 99, 86 S. Ct. at 218 (Fortas, J., concurring),
131. 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).
132. Id. at 369, 88 S. Ct. at 1675.
133. University Military Training and Service Act, ch. 625, §§ 12(b)(1)-(5), 62 Stat. 622 (1948)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462(b)(3) (1990)).
134. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
135. Id. at 377, 88 S. Ct. 1679.
136. See infra text at pp. 322-324. The O'Brien standard was reiterated and approved in
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
There, the Court rejected "the notion that a city is powerless to protect its citizens from unwanted
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The question of whether a restriction on begging punishes an individual for
his status 1 7 as a poor person, rather than for a particular act, is analogous to
the situation in Powell v. Texas. 38. In Powell, the defendant was convicted of
violating an ordinance prohibiting public drunkenness."' The defendant
maintained that the ordinance punished him for an "involuntary" characteristic
of his status as a chronic alcoholic, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.)4  The plurality opinion
authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, however, held that the ordinance did not
punish anyone for a particular status, but rather "for public behavior which may
create substantial health and safety hazards,. . . and which offends the moral and
esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the community."' 4' This is, amongst
other goals, what cities such as Seattle and Baltimore are trying to accomplish.
In the late 1960s, courts began to confront the question of the constitutional-
ity of vagrancy laws. In the 1966 case Hicks v. District of Columbia,4 1 the
majority dismissed a writ of certiorari on the technical ground that the petition
was untimely and the record inadequate.' 43 Justice William 0. Douglas
dissented, arguing that the definition of vagrancy in the District of Columbia's
statute was unconstitutionally vague, and also that crimes which focus on status
alone violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Douglas
thought that issue was sufficiently important for the Court to exercise its
discretion and pass judgment on the case.'"
In 1972, the Supreme Court held Jacksonville, Florida's vagrancy statute
unconstitutional in an opinion by Justice Douglas that echoed his dissent in
Hicks. 45  In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Court held that the
ordinance's definition of vagrancy, with its language only slightly altered from
the Elizabethan statute of 1597, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court
reasoned that the statute failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice
that any particular conduct might be prohibited, and also that it opened the door
to arbitrary law enforcement.46 Justice Douglas' concerns, though, seem to
go beyond the problem of vagueness. He argued that the ordinance made
criminal "activities which by modern standards are normally innocent."' 147 The
exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance."
Id. at 805, 104 S. Ct. at 2129.
137. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962) (stating that punishment for
status alone violates the Eighth Amendment).
138. 392 U.S. 514, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968).
139. Id. at 517, 88 S. Ct. at 2146.
140. Id., 88 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
141. Id. at 532, 88 S. Ct. at 2154.
142. 383 U.S. 252, 86 S. Ct. 798 (1966).
143. Id. at 252, 86 S. Ct. at 798.
144. Id. at 252-58, 86 S. Ct. at 798-801 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972).
146. Id. at 162, 92 S. Ct. at 843.
147. Id. at 163, 92 S. Ct. at 844.
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opinion, replete with homages to aimless wandering, marks the outer boundary
for jurisdictions seeking to address the topic of aggressive solicitations.' 4 8
Following the Court's sweeping decision in Papachristou, most cities and
states ceased enforcing any restrictions on beggars or vagrants. This change
stopped the enforcement of laws which had often been applied in an arbitrary
and racist manner. 49 It also had a baneful effect as police departments became
increasingly reluctant to impose any standards of public civility. The baby was
tossed out with the proverbial bathwater, leaving urban residents and visitors to
cope with increasing sidewalk anarchy.
Controls on aggressive begging represent an attempt to reverse that trend.
The response by the judiciary, to attempts to re-establish civility in public spaces
while retaining civil liberties, has been mixed.
2. Response to Controls on Solicitations for Money
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether panhandling is protected by
the First Amendment. Nonetheless, in four opinions, it provided directions that
can be gainfully used by those drafting legislation in this area.
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,'5" the
Court held that certain solicitation by a charitable organization is protected First
Amendment speech. The ordinance in question in Schaumburg prohibited door-
to-door or on-the-street solicitation by organizations not using at least seventy-
five percent of their funds for "charitable purposes."'' The Court held that
"charitable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of
speech interests-communication of information, the dissemination and
propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that are within the
protection of the First Amendment."' 52 Charitable solicitation is, at the same
time, subject to reasonable regulation, although it must be '"undertaken with due
regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes
or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues."' 53 The instant
ordinance was found to be unconstitutionally overbroad. 4
The Schaumburg decision sets forth the reasons why some solicitations by
strangers come within the protection of the First Amendment. In doing so, it
focused on the underlying message, and the contribution that message makes to
the community.
148. Id. at 163-64, 92 S. Ct. at 843-44.
149. See generally, Foote, supra note 78..
150. 444 U.S. 620, 100 S. Ct. 826 (1980).
151. Id. at 624, 100 S. Ct. at 829.
152. Id. at 632, 100 S. Ct. at 833.
153. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 834.
154. Id. at 639, 100 S. Ct. at 837.
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In 1984, the Supreme Court applied the O'Brien test in holding constitution-
al a National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in Washington's
Lafayette Park (located across the street from the White House). 55 The
challengers to the regulation, self-proclaimed advocates for the homeless, wanted
to sleep in the park to demonstrate their consternation with the level of
government spending going to their constituents. The Court found the anti-
sleeping regulation in question to be content-neutral, declaring that it was
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,' 56 and was
not applied "because of disagreement with the message presented."'51 7 In other
words, people were free to advocate for any message, provided that begging was
not done in an aggressive manner.
The Supreme Court directly addressed the topic of solicitation for money in
United States v. Kokinda.'58 In Kokinda, the Court considered a Postal Service
regulation prohibiting solicitation of contributions on sidewalks outside of post
offices. The Court found the prohibition of face-to-face solicitation justified,
given its disruptive nature. 59
Although the case did not directly deal with street panhandling, the Court
offered some clear views on the subject, commenting that "[a]s residents of
metropolitan areas know from daily experience, confrontation by a person asking
for money disrupts passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an
encounter with a person giving out information."'" The Court thus firmly
distinguished the dissemination of information, which contributes to the public
discourse, from mere begging. This distinction apparently arises from a
recognition that begging contains no substantive message, is disruptive, and is
intimidating.
The Kokinda court also clarified the "narrowly tailored" element of the
O'Brien test, holding that "[e]ven if more narrowly tailored regulations Could be
promulgated, . .. the Postal Service is only required to adopt reasonable
regulations, not 'the most reasonable or the only reasonable' regulation
possible."'
6 1
Moving from post offices to airports, the Court upheld a regulation of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banning "solicitation and receipt
of funds" in a "continuous or repetitive manner" within airport terminals.
62
The plurality opinion in International Society of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was centered on four Justices' conclusion
155. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S. Ct. 3065,(1984).
156. Id. at 293, 104 S. Ct. at 3069.
157. Id. at 295, 104 S. Ct. 3070.
158. 497 U.S. 720, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
159. Id. at 733, 110 S. Ct. at 3123.
160. Id. at 734, 110 S. Ct. at 3123.
161. Id. at 735-36, 110 S. Ct. at 3124 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3452 (1985)).
162. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2704 (1992).
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that the airport is not a "traditional public forum," because, unlike the public
streets, the Port Authority has never considered the free exchange of ideas to be
one of its principal purposes. 3 Therefore, there was no heightened First
Amendment analysis; the regulation "need[ed] only satisfy a requirement of
reasonableness."'1
Although the "public forum" category applies to the parks and sidewalks, the
plurality's basis for upholding the regulation as reasonable is relevant to the
sidewalk panhandler. It found that face-to-face solicitation impedes pedestrian
traffic and presents risks of coercion and fraud. 65  That conclusion would
apply on urban streets as well.
Justice Anthony Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's public forum
analysis.' 6 Even though he viewed the airport as a public forum, Justice
Kennedy concurred with the plurality in upholding the Port Authority regula-
tion. 67 Because he upheld the ordinance despite concluding that airports were
a public forum, his views are the most relevant to an analysis of contr.31s on
aggressive begging, and probably foreshadow any future Supreme Court decision
on public begging.
Justice Kennedy viewed the ban on face-to-face solicitation as either a
"reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, or as a regulation directed at the
nonspeech element of expressive conduct."'' 68 He characterized the regulation
as a time, place, or manner restriction because it did not prohibit all speech that
solicits funds, but only "personal solicitations for immediate payment of money."
He also viewed it as a restriction of nonspeech elements because, like street
begging, it was "directed only at the physical exchange of money."' 69 These
conditions are all true with regard to street begging.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy found the restriction to be content-neutral
because it was aimed at the conduct element of the exchange of money and not
at any particular message. 70 Justices Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented,
agreeing with Justice Kennedy's public forum analysis, but asserted that, as there
163. Id. at 2706.
164. Id. at 2708.
165. Id. Justice O'Connor concurred in upholding the regulation, agreeing that airports are not
public fora, but emphasizing that the proper standard should be whether the regulation is "reasonably
related to maintaining the multipurpose environment" of the Port Authority's airports. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2713 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (all
concurrences and dissents in both International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2701 and a related case, Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992)
(per curiam) are reported here under a separate heading).
166. Justice Kennedy maintained that the plurality's analysis would "leave almost no scope for
the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of the government." Id. at 2716
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 2720.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2721.
170. Id. at 2722.
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was no actual evidence of coercion or fraud, the restriction was unreason-
able. 7'
To summarize, the Supreme Court has treated restrictions on the solicitation
of alms lightly, and has indicated that it is willing to distinguish its precedents
protecting solicitation by recognized charities from common panhandling.
B. The View of Other Federal Courts
Until quite recently, the federal courts have not been faced with the specific
issue of regulation of begging. In the past few years, however, the most
important decisions regarding begging limitations have come from federal district
and circuit courts.
The first federal court to consider, the constitutionality of the begging clause
of a vagrancy statute was the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado in Goldman v. Knecht.' The Court struck down the statute before
it, although the precedent the court set is far from clear.
The Colorado statute declared unconstitutional in Goldman included a
provision prohibiting "begging or leading an idle, immoral, or profligate course
of life."' The Court remarked that the term "begging" was sufficiently clear,
but that the rest of the clause was unconstitutionally vague, as it left law
enforcement officers with unbridled discretion to determine what activities might
be "idle, immoral, or profligate."'' The Court further held that the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "because it
punish[ed] all vagrants as future criminals despite the fact that many never resort
to criminality."'
7 5
The decision did not address the government's attempt to control the act of
begging, except to declare that the use of "begging" in a statute would not create
a vagueness problem. Furthermore, an aggressive begging statute would
presumably be valid under this analysis because it would not punish anyone
solely because of the possibility of future harm.
In 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered a New York City Transit Authority Regulation prohibiting begging
on the city's subway system, and issued what has become the strongest and most
persuasive decision in the field.1 76  The Circuit Court decision reversed a
171. Id. at 2724-25 (Souter, J., dissenting), The Supreme Court later let stand a Circuit ruling
upholding a Kentucky law allowing some solicitations on highways, but preventing groups from
distributing literature on the same roads. The logic of the law, if not the decision, appears to
contradict the hierarchy created by the ISKCON decision. See Ater v. Armstrong, 961 F.2d 1224 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 493 (1992).
172. 295 F. Supp. 897 (D.Co. 1969).
173. Id. at 905 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-8-19 (1963)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 906-07.
176. Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing 21
N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6).
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decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, which had held that begging was speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, and that the regulation in question was an unreasonable restriction of that
freedom. 177
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, expressly holding
that panhandling is not speech protected by the First Amendment.' The court
viewed begging not in terms of a spoken appeal, but rather as a physical
transfer/reception of money, stating that "[c]ommon sense tells us that begging
is much more 'conduct' than it is 'speech."" 179 The court further held that
begging was not expression covered by the First Amendment. It focused on the
lack of "'[a]n intent to convey a particularized message,"' and the unlikelihood
"'that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.""'..0 The only
message recognized by the court as common to all acts of begging was the desire
to be given money, which the court held to be "far outside the scope of protected
speech under the First Amendment.'.' 8  Moreover, the court distinguished
begging from solicitation by organized charities, as "there is a sufficient nexus
between solicitation by organized charities and a 'variety of speech interests' to
invoke protection under the First Amendment."' 82
The Young court also covered its flank, offering an alternative holding that
accepted, arguendo, that "give me a dollar" fell within the constitutional
protection given to speech. Even if begging were protected expression, the
Circuit Court reasoned, the regulation would be valid under the standard
enunciated in United States v. O'Brien.' Under the O'Brien test, a limitation
of expression combined with conduct is valid if it is within the constitutional
power of the government, it furthers an important or substantial government
interest, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and any incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to further the interest.' 4 The court implicitly
recognized that the regulation was within the Transit Authority's power. The
second prong of the test led the court to proclaim that begging in the subway
"often amounts to nothing less than assault, creating in the passengers the
apprehension of imminent danger," and was thus within the government's interest
to prohibit. 5 The third criterion of the O'Brien test is essentially a require-
ment of content neutrality. The Young court viewed the subway begging
177. Id.
178. Id. at 152-54.
179. Id. at 153.
180. Id. at 153 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989)
(quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 2730 (1974)).
181. Id. at 154.
182. Id. at 155.
183. Id. at 157.
184. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1968)).
185. Id. at 158.
1993]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prohibition as content neutral because the justification for 'the regulation,
prevention of intimidation and harassment, was unrelated to any message
communicated.' 86 Regarding the final criterion, the court held that the Transit
Authority was able to demonstrate that begging necessarily leads to aggressive
begging and "the only effective way to stop begging in the system was through
the enforcement of a total ban."'87
The landmark decision in Young stands for the proposition that begging is
not speech entitled to any protection under the First Amendment. The decision
laid bare any claim that there was any significant social message conveyed in
"give me a dollar," and recognized the intrusion created by a panhandler.
The scope of Young did not prove to be very broad. When a federal district
court in New York City was confronted with a sweeping prohibition on all
begging, the court struck it down as unconstitutional.'88 The latter decision is
entirely inconsistent with the conclusion that panhandling is not speech and is
therefore not entitled to constitutional protection.
In Loper v. New York City Police Department, 89 the district court heard
evidence on the "Broken Windows" effect. The police put on evidence that
beggars tend to congregate in certain areas, that residents are intimidated by
panhandlers, that beggars cause business to decline, block sidewalks, engage in
aggressive and threatening behavior, and make fraudulent representations.
Nonetheless, it chose to ignore Young, and not only find that begging should
receive First Amendment protection, but that the beggar's interest (defined
largely as "calling his condition to the attention of the general public")'"
outweighed that of the community, broken windows and all.
In reaching its decision, the Loper court chose to balance competing
interests, largely circumnavigating all of the tests set down by the Supreme Court
in O'Brien and elsewhere for reviewing First Amendment claims.'9 ' In doing
so the court observed that:
Walking through New York's Times Square, one is bombarded with
messages. Giant billboards and flashing neon lights dazzle; marquees
beckon; peddlers hawk; preachers beseech; the news warily wraps
around the old Times Building; and especially around the holidays, the
186. Id. at 158-59.
187. Id. at 160.
188. See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 999
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). Loper was a class action, brought on behalf of "all needy people who live
in the State of New York, who beg on the public streets or the public parks of New York City." The
court defined "needy person" as "someone who, because of poverty, is unable to pay for the
necessities of life, such as food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and transportation." Id. at 1033. The
general applicability of this description to either panhandlers or the homeless is very much open to
question. See Baum and Bums, supra note 21.
189. Loper, 802 F. Supp. 1029.
190. Id. at 1042.
191. See id. The fact that the legislature presumably already did so did not appear to concern
the court.
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Salvation Army band plays on. One generally encounters a beggar too.
Of all these solicitators, though, the only one subject to a blanket
restriction is the beggar.""
The court's description may lead a person to believe that beggars are being
unfairly singled out, and that their effect on the community is the same as the
news ticker tape. In fact, amongst the sources of sensory input listed by Judge
Sweet, only beggars present a direct, in-your-face, solicitation aimed at particular
individuals.
The court's decision was nonetheless narrow. Judge Sweet tells us that "a
ban on aggressive begging would probably survive scrutiny, "as would a
complete ban on begging in certain areas, such as outside of automatic teller
machines."' 93  The New York law, reaching loitering for the purpose of
begging, was rejected because it "cuts off all means of allowing beggars to
communicate their message of solicitation."
The district court decision was upheld by a panel of the second circuit."9
Although a setback for residents of urban areas, the decision will not necessarily
interfere with the passage and enforcement of anti-aggressive panhandling
laws.' 95
The appeals court primarily relied upon the distinction between a ban on
begging in the confined area of New York's subways, and a ban on begging
throughout the city.' 6 The latter is not only less confining, it is also a public
forum, thereby subjecting the restriction to the highest level of judicial
scrutiny.' 97 The second circuit saw the prohibition on loitering for the purpose
of begging as leaving panhandlers "without the means to communicate their
individual wants and needs." ' Relying on the charitable solicitation cases, the
court determined that begging is at least a form of speech:
Begging frequently is accompanied by speech indicating the need for
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, or transportation. Even without
particularized speech, however, the presence of an unkept and dishev-
elled person, holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation,
itself conveys a message of need for support and assistance. 9
192. Id. at 1039.
193. Id. at 1040 (emphasis added). We cannot be sure about the ATM exception or other area
bans on begging in public forums. Judge Sweet also said that "the answer is not in criminalizing
those people, debtor's prisons being -long gone, but in addressing the root cause of their existence.
The root cause is not served by removing them from sight, however; society is then able to pretend
they do not exist a little longer." Id. at 1046.
194. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
195. id. at 701.
196. Id. at 702.
197. Id. at 703, 704.
198. Id. at 702.
199, Id. at 704. The court took this for grated, without consideration of the neediness of those
begging. See generally Baum and Bums, supra note 21.
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Given the resulting "compelling state interest" test, the old statute was
almost bound to fail, and it did. Even if the state was considered to have a
compelling interest in preventing the evils associated with begging, a statute that
totally prohibits begging in all public places was unlikely to be considered
narrowly tailored.' The court was therefore led to conclude that the socializa-
tion was analogous to solicitations by organized charities.2"' If the state of
New York permitted the latter, it must not ban the former.
The court closed with a favorable mention of Seattle's anti-aggressive
panhandling/pedestrial interference ordinance,20 2 thus seemingly leaving the
door open for a more circumscribed approach to the panhandling problem by the
New York City Council.
C. The Ignoble Blair Decision
The authorities in San Francisco used a narrower approach to their
panhandling problem as compared to New York City. There, the city began with
enforcement of a state statute aimed only at aggressive begging (accosting while
begging) rather than a sweeping ban on begging.20 3
Despite this limitation (a limitation absent in the Loper case), a federal judge
struck down the statute, holding that there is a constitutional right to accost
people for the purpose of begging. 2°4 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California disagreed with the Second Circuit's decision in
Young, holding that panhandling is speech protected under the First Amend-
ment.205 That court criticized the Second Circuit's differentiation between
solicitation by organizations and by individuals on their own behalf, noting that
"[n]o distinction of constitutional dimension exists between soliciting funds for
oneself and for charities. '2° In a stunning confrontation with reality, the Blair
court held that "[blegging gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views
and ideas on, among other things, the way our society treats its poor and
disenfranchised," and that the communication of these additional messages
qualified begging as protected speech.20 7
Having held that section 647(c) was a content-based restriction "aimed
specifically at protected speech in a public forum," the court found the proper
standard not in the O'Brien test, but in the more restrictive standard enunciated
in Boos v. Barry. That test requires that the regulation be "'necessary to serve
200. Loper, 999 F.2d at 705.
201. Id. at 704.
202. Id. at 706.
203. Cal. Penal Code § 647(c) (West 1977).
204. See Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
205. Id. at 1324.
206. Id. at 1322.
207. Id. at 1322-23.
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a compelling state interest and ... is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 2
The court accepted a California Court of Appeals interpretation that the purpose
of the statute was "to avoid 'annoyance' to the public," an interest that the court
found "hardly compelling."2'
The Blair decision is beset with flaws, perhaps emanating from the trial
judge's dissatisfaction with the government's treatment of the poor. Although
the court saw an expressive message in the act of begging, it provided no
explanation as to why anyone, poor or not, was in any way prohibited from
conversing on the plight of the poor, the adequacy of government poverty
programs, or any other subject.
The Blair court also mistakenly merged charity with begging. Because the
Supreme Court rulings protecting charitable solicitations rely on the underlying
policy issues inherent in such solicitation, and the charity's resulting contribution
to the polity, the validity of the comparison rises or falls depending on whether
there is truly a message that is being conveyed or obstructed other than, "I want
money."
Further, the court in Blair gave short shrift to the problem of urban civility
(a criticism that cannot be leveled against the Loper decision). Perhaps the judge
manages to avoid the downtown area of San Francisco. Most people, however,
are hardly so fortunate. In other words, the decision can be seen as a singular
judicial activist misguidingly trying to help the poor by making life difficult for
the general urban population.
The Blair decision was simply wrong, representing judicial activism at its
worst, and presenting a danger to the desire of the average citizen to regain
urban centers as desirable places to live and work.210
D. Anti-Begging Laws in the State Courts
The begging and vagrancy laws were of such ancient origin and so well
accepted that, until recently, cases concerning begging usually did not reach
courts of record. When they did, it was on a definitional or evidentiary issue
rather than a question of constitutionality and governmental authority.
One of the most important (and wrenching) of these cases was a New York
case, In re Hailer."' The case demonstrates the consequences of moving
208. Id. at 1324 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988)).
209. Id. (citing Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d
263, 265, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1976)). Finally, the Blair court held that § 647(c) also violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the statute allowed one to accost a
person for the purpose of requesting something other than money for oneself. The Court conceded
that such a distinction could be valid if narrowly tailored to the achievement of a compelling end,
but that in this case the state had not met its burden of proof. Id. at 1325-26.
210. The case, as of this writing, is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Blair v. Shanahan, Nos. 92-
15447, Nos. 92-15447, 92-15459, 92-15451 (9th Cir. 1992).
211. 53 N.Y. 131 (1877).
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beyond aggressive panhandling measures and seeking a prohibition on all
begging at all locations.
In Hailer, a crippled ten-year-old, while moving on his hands and knees
through the Wall Street area of Manhattan, held out his hand to several
pedestrians. Many passersby, concerned about the boy's physical plight, gave
him money." 2 The boy, Frank Haller, was arrested under a New York law
which forbade any child from "begging for alms or soliciting charity from door
to door, or in any street, highway or public place of any city or town. '21 3 The
police officers who arrested him had not heard the boy ask for money, but had
seen him extend his hand and receive money several times." 4
Consequently, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
petitioned for review of the matter, maintaining that such silent action did not
constitute "begging alms" or "soliciting charity" within the meaning of the
statute."' The New York court rejected this argument, holding that extending
a hand constituted "begging alms," while noting that "[t]here is nothing in either
of these statutes that necessarily requires proof of spoken words to constitute
begging for alms or soliciting charity, although such words might in many
instances be the best evidence of the offense. '21 6 While Judge Davis conceded
that arresting a poor crippled boy might seem harsh, he pointed out that "[tihe
intention of the law is not to punish such children, but to protect and provide for
their necessities with tender care.
217
By the late 1960s, vagrancy statutes had come under attack in some state
courts. In Alegata v. Commonwealth,.. the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, foreshadowing Papachristou, held a vagrancy law criminalizing
idleness unconstitutionally vague.2 9 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that a similar provision was not vague, because "[n]one of the
words employed [in the statute] are in any sense technical words of art, the
meaning of which would not be understood by people of ordinary experience and
understanding. 220 Moreover, the vagrant was still referred to as "the chrysalis
of every species of criminal. 2 2'
212. Id. at 131.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 132. Resorting to rights assertions was less common at the time.
216. Id. Twenty-six years later, a French court came to a similar conclusion. Bourges, 30 avr.
1896, D.P. 96.2.455.
217. Hailer, 53 N.Y. at 132. New York law called for invalids to be handed over to the
Commissioner of Charities, who had full discretion to return him immediately to his parents.
218. 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1967).
219. Id. at 207.
220. Wallace v. State, 161 S.E.2d 288, 290 (Ga. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123, 89 S. Ct.
995 (1969). The Georgia Court, furthermore, held that the vagrancy statute did not punish mere
poverty, and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
221. Id. at 290 (quoting Ex parte Branch, 137 S.W. 886 (1911)).
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The first case to uphold a statute which prohibited loitering for the purpose
of begging was from Arizona, State ex rel. Williams v. City Court of Tucson.222
That court held that the ordinance as a whole was not vague.223 The court
further distinguished the case from Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,22 4 as
the instant ordinance did not place "unfettered discretion" in the hands of the
police. 25 As noted previously, a similar law in New York was struck down
by a federal court last year.
226
In Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist.,227 a
California Court of Appeal considered the state statute22 1 that was later attacked
in Blair v. Shanahan. 2 9 The Ulmer court held that the statute did not impinge
on First Amendment freedoms because it forbids the "approach" rather than any
message.230  This distinction between the speech and conduct involved in
begging was rejected fifteen years later when the same statute came before the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of California in Blair.3'
Two years later, the Supreme Court of California declared a Los Angeles
ordinance unconstitutional that forbade any person to "seek, beg, or solicit
custom, patronage, sales, alms or donations for himself or on behalf of any
person" on property owned by the City without written permission from the head
of the department housed on the property. 232  In People v. Fogelson, an
adherent of the Hare Krishna faith was arrested for soliciting contributions
without a permit in the Los Angeles International Airport.233 The court found
the ordinance overbroad as it could be applied to communication protected under
the First Amendment, and it did not provide guidance to ensure that officials
would not impair constitutionally protected expression.234 The court's disagree-
ment, though, involved the discretion granted to the airport authorities, not with
the fact that there was a control on begging. Citing Ulmer in his concurring
opinion, Justice Mosk emphasized that while the ordinance in question was
unconstitutional, "it is not impossible for the city to reasonably regulate the
public conduct of mendicants, including those who purport to be motivated by
222. 520 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
223. Id.
224. 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972).
225. State ex rel. Williams, 520 P.2d at 1170.
226. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999 F.2d
699 (2d Cir. 1993).
227. 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1976).
228. Cal. Penal Code, § 647(c) (West 1988).
229. 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
230. Ulmer, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 267, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
231. Blair, 775 F. Supp. 1315.
232. People v. Fogelson, 577 P.2d 677, 678 n.1 (1978) (quoting Los Angeles, Cal., Mun. Code
§ 42.14.1).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 681-82.
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religious fervor."235 This distinction was confirmed by Justice Kennedy and
a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Krishna, which ruled that
direct solicitation for money can be prohibited at airports, while other solicitation
must be tolerated.236
The rejection of an absolute ban on begging, the issue in Loper, was before
the Florida Court of Appeals. 237  The Florida court held that an absolute
prohibition of all forms of begging or soliciting alms for oneself in all public
spaces went too far. 38 The ordinance in question, again from Jackson-
ville,239 made it unlawful "for anyone to beg or solicit alms in the streets or
public places of the city or exhibit oneself for the purpose of begging or
obtaining alms." 240  While the court recognized the City's "police power to
control undue annoyance on the streets and public places and prevent the
blocking of vehicle and pedestrian traffic,"2'' it found the ordinance invalid
under the First Amendment because it limited expression "in a more intrusive
manner than necessary. 2  The court distinguished Ulmer, noting that the
California statute only prohibited accosting others for the purpose of begging,
and was therefore more narrowly drawn than the Jacksonville ordinance.243
Indeed, the court remarked that no compelling reason could justify a complete
prohibition of an expressive activity, a category which begging, in the court's
view, fit.2
44
This distinction parallels the debate among those seeking legislation in this
area. Some prefer an absolute ban, while others advocate for a more tailored
approach. The Florida decision is another major impetus for municipalities to
adopt aggressive begging measures, rather than absolute begging prohibitions.
Confidence in the constitutionality of anti-aggressive begging measures was
further strengthened when the Washington Supreme Court became the highest
court to consider a city ordinance aimed specifically at aggressive panhandling
and pedestrian interference. In City of Seattle v. Webster,245 the Washington
court considered a Seattle ordinance which made it unlawful to "intentionally
obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic. 246 The respondent maintained that the
ordinance was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.2 47 The court denied
that the ordinance was overbroad, because of the intent element in the definition
235. Id. at 683.
236. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1992).
237. C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
238. Id. at 50.
239. Jacksonville, Fla., Mun. Ordinance 330.105.
240. C.C.B., 458 So. 2d at 48.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 50.
243. Id. at 49.
244. Id. at 50.
245. 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1690 (1991).
246. Id. at 1334 (citing Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 12A.12.015(B)(1)).
247. Id.
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of the offense.248 Thus, the ordinance would not prevent "mere sauntering or
loitering on a public way," but only intentionally blocking another's passage or
causing one to "take evasive action."249
The Court also held that the element of intent saved the ordinance from
being unconstitutionally vague." With that requirement, the mendicant knows
that intentionally obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic is unlawful. 25
Moreover, the Washington court dismissed the respondent's claim that the
ordinance violated the equal protection rights of beggars, noting that the
ordinance applies equally to all persons possessing the requisite intent, and that
the courts of the State of Washington had never declared the homeless to be a
protected class for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
252
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-AGGRESSIVE BEGGING LAWS: SOME
CONCLUSIONS BASED ON POLICY AND PRECEDENT
The constitutionality of laws regarding begging has been challenged under
the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause
of the federal constitution.253 Such challenges have had varying degrees of
success depending on whether the provision in question is an absolute prohibition
of begging in all public places,254 a prohibition of begging' in a specific area,
or a limitation on the manner in which a person may beg ("aggressive begging"
measures).
This section analyzes begging controls under four possible constitutional
pigeonholes: 1) as speech or conduct not protected under the First Amendment;
2) as a time, place, and manner restriction; 3) as a regulation of conduct with an
expressive element; and 4) as a control on commercial speech. All of these
categories (only one is needed), with all of the resulting tests and factors, yield
a conclusion that anti-aggressive begging laws are constitutional.
A. Is Begging Protected Speech?
Not everything a person says or does is protected by the First Amendment.
"It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
248. Id. at 1338.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1339.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1340.
253. In particular cases, we could expect to see state constitutional challenges as well, which
would parallel the arguments made under the United States Constitution.
254. See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). Many absolute prohibitions are part of vagrancy statutes which have not
been enforced since such laws were held unconstitutional in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972), although some cities such as Phoenix, Arizona and Austin, Texas still
forbid any sort of begging in all public places.
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undertakes ... but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the
protection of the First Amendment."2 5 Rather, the Amendment reaches only
"the freedom of speech. ' 56
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Young v. New York City Transit
Authority,2 7 held that begging is not speech. Under this view, it would appear
that even an absolute ban on begging in all public places would be constitutional.
In Young, the court noted that, "common sense tells us that begging is much
more 'conduct' than it is 'speech." '258  Although the court never made it
explicit, it seemed to construe the term "begging" as referring to the action of
receiving money rather than the speech involved in requesting alms. 259 That
view, however, was not adopted by another panel of the same circuit court. 6
Even if begging is held not to be speech per se, it may yet be considered
expressive conduct. Walking up and reaching out to a person for the purpose of
asking for money constitutes actions. An action is expressive conduct protected
by the First Amendment when "an intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and.., likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it. ' 2 6' Although "[t]he Government generally has a freer
hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or
spoken word, ' 262 conduct still receives some protection under the First
Amendment.
The pertinent question then is what constitutes a message. It is incredible
to assert that those who beg do so in order to express some political or.economic
idea. Rather, the beggar's aim is to obtain money from passersby.263 Standing
alone, an offer to exchange nothing for money does not communicate anything
concerning a condition, society in general, or any other subject. In fact, in terms
of communication, the beggar stands in the same position as the hold-up man
with a gun.264 Both could be seen as purely commercial activity, albeit without
the exchange of any goods or services.
The Young court remarked on the lack of a particularized message associated
with begging and the extreme unlikeliness of any message being understood by
any audience. The court stated that:
255. City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (1989).
256. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
257. 903 F.2d 146, 153-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
258. Id. at 153.
259. In a recent concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy characterized a ban on solicitation and
receipt of funds at an airport as a "valid regulation of the nonspeech element of expressive conduct."
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2720 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
260: Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
261. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 2730 (1974).
262. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989).
263. But see Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
264. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
984, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990).
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[t]he only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of
begging is that beggars want to exact money from those whom they
accost. While we acknowledge that passengers generally understand
this generic message, we think it falls far outside the scope of protected
speech under the First Amendment.2 65
In considering California's anti-begging statute, the California Appeals Court
agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion, stating that "begging and soliciting
for alms do not necessarily involve the communication of information or opinion;
therefore, approaching individuals for that purpose is not protected by the First
Amendment."'
In Blair v. Shanahan,267 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California made flowers grow out of the desert of a beggar's
utterances. The court focused on information that may be exchanged in
conversation that is in addition, and incidental, to the actual begging.26 8 These
conversations, however, are neither banned nor regulated by the California statute
or by the other anti-aggressive panhandling measures. Indeed, in San Francisco
and elsewhere, we can assume that they take place frequently, and with vigor.
Similarly, the Loper appeals court not only saw something expressive about
the mere existence of beggars, it purported to know what the underlying message
was: a "need for support and assistance."2 69
Blair has cut across the current of the law in this area, which has distin-
guished in-your-face solicitations from both mail solicitations and solicitations
by charities. Specifically, with charities, spreading the word is the primary goal.
The Supreme Court said that, "the reality [is] that without [such] solicitation[s]
the flow of ... information and advocacy would likely cease."270 But,
"[p]anhandling ... is strictly for the pecuniary gain of the speaker. 27 1
If begging is not protected by the First Amendment, then, as a source of
harassment, it can be legitimately prohibited. Indeed, as this article has
demonstrated, communities in this country and elsewhere have a long history of
protecting the public from harassing solicitations, whether for money, sex, or
drugs. One might argue that, if a state may prohibit an offer to trade sex for
currency, it can surely prohibit trading nothing for the same currency.
265. Id. at 154.
266. Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 266,
127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1976).
267. 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
268. id. at 1322.
269. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993). These
explanations are not self-evident. Others may come upon a beggar and conclude the message was
a need to eliminate minimum wage laws so as to create more job opportunities, or simply a desire
to not work, drink heavily, and be supported by others.
270. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S. Ct. at 834.
271. Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, in Blair v. Shanahan, Nos. 92-
15447, 92-15450, 92-15451 (9th Cir. 1992).
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However, only the Young court has voiced this opinion. The Ulmer court,
in holding constitutional California Penal Code § 647(c), specified that the
provision was valid because it did not prohibit all begging, but only a particular
activity sometimes associated with it.272 The Florida Court of Appeals and the
district court in New York emphasized this same distinction when they
recognized that the manner (and perhaps location) of begging might be
legitimately restricted, but that a prohibition on begging altogether was an
infringement of protected speech. 3 Indeed, even the Young court cautiously
offered an alternative justification for its holding.
I conclude that begging does not "say" anything about a person's state of
mind sufficient to come within "the freedom of speech" protected by the First
Amendment. At the same time, if begging is deemed to have an expressive
element, any regulation must be directed to its non-expressive components. For
this reason, measures aimed only at aggressive begging stand a far better chance
of withstanding constitutional attack.
B. Time, Place, and Manner
Assuming panhandling is constitutionally protected speech, or protected
expressive conduct, it is still subject to certain curtailments and regulations.
Restrictions on certain types of begging could still be constitutional as a content-
neutral restriction of the time, place, or manner of speech. The standard for
content-neutral regulation was succinctly stated by the Fifth Circuit in Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge,2 7 4 which
pointed out that whereas "[c]ontent-based regulation[s] must be necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and [must] be narrowly drawn to achieve that
end; content-neutral regulations of [the] time, place, and manner of expression
are enforceable if they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
275
Additionally, the government's interest must be unrelated to the suppression
of speech, and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
must not be greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government's
276 isepurpose. This is essentially the same test that is applied to expressive
conduct.
27 7
272. Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 267,
127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447-48 (1976).
273. C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Loper v. New York City
Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) ("a ban
on aggressive begging would probably survive scrutiny").
274. 876 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1989).
275. Id. at 497.
276. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1968).
277. Id..
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1. Are Controls on Beggars Content-Neutral?
The content neutrality of a law is determined not by any incidental effect it
may have on speech, but by the reason for its promulgation. In other words, the
neutrality of a statute depends on whether it is "justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech."27
In upholding a ban on solicitation and immediate receipt of funds, Justice
Kennedy wrote that "[b]ecause the Port Authority's solicitation ban is directed
at ... abusive practices and not at any particular message [or] idea, . . ., the
regulation is a content-neutral rule serving a significant government interest. ' 279
Laws against begging are not aimed at any message or idea communicated
by the panhandler. Although some older anti-begging laws included in vagrancy
statutes were passed in order to rid the jurisdiction of a potentially dangerous
class, most of the current restrictions on begging are meant to prevent intimida-
tion and coercion in public spaces. Moreover, laws against aggressive begging
or pedestrian interference do not restrict the expression of any message, idea, or
form of speech. Indeed, people are free to ask others for money, provided that
they do so in an appropriate manner. A panhandler may still solicit alms and
discourse upon her plight. She may not do so, however, in the aggressive
manner proscribed by the statute. There is no discrimination between view-
points.
In Heffron v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,2' the
United States Supreme Court held that a ban on solicitations is content-neutral
because it applied to all seeking to solicit. The Court noted that the restriction
there was not intended to silence one particular message and was not an attempt
to regulate ideas. At the same time, the Court held that the regulation was valid
although it did not address other potentially harmful situations.2 8'
Nonetheless, the argument is not fool-proof. As Judge Sweet pointed out,
of all possible accosts, only the solicitation for money by non-charities falls
under these laws. A person can now approach strangers on the street for nearly
any reason, but not to beg. There is a risk that, if begging is speech, its
regulation could be beyond the power of government to curtail.
One way out of this dilemma may be to allow beggars to say anything they
please, but to prohibit the giving of money on the street. This approach" calls for
a focus on the supply side of the transaction, rather than the demand from the
destitute. Such an ordinance does not really address the intrusiveness caused by
278. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069
(1984).
279. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
280. 452 U.S. 640, 649, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (1981) (restriction which "prefers listener-
initiated exchanges to those originating with the speaker" is content-neutral, and is acceptable as a
time, place, and manner restriction on speech).
281. Id. at 648-49, 101 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
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begging, although it may moot the point by driving the beggars "out of
business." Also, the Supreme Court has held that the giving of money, at least
in certain contexts, is protected speech under the First Amendment.
28 2
Another troublesome aspect of this alternative is that it would prevent all
transfer of money in public, including paying a legitimate debt, parents giving
lunch money to their children, and the donation to a charity. It seems preferable,
then, to focus on the problem that is really bothering people. It is the intrusive,
aggravating, community-inhibiting solicitation of aggressive panhandlers that is
irksome, and not the actual transfer of funds.
The best way to confront the content-neutrality issue is head-on. That is,
assert that, because a beggar's speech is not prohibited, the community can
regulate his or her method of presentation. This approach, taken by Justice
Kennedy in Krishna,283 calls for a focus on the conduct even though the neutral
regulation only applies to people who make a certain kind of utterance.
While the issue is a close one, it appears that laws aimed at aggressive
begging (but not sweeping begging prohibitions) pass the content-neutrality test.
No side in any debate is being given an advantage, unfair or otherwise. 284
2. The Community's Substantial Interest
Once the content neutrality of a statute is established, it must be shown that
the statute "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; ... [and
that] the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.,
285
Panhandling controls are aimed at protecting the public from intimidation.
The Supreme Court of the United States has deemed such an interest to be
compelling, noting that "face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are
an appropriate target of regulation, [and that] [t]he skillful, and unprincipled,
solicitor can target the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children
or those suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the
solicitation."286
The state's interest in regulating individual solicitation is greater than its
interest in regulating many other kinds of public activity, "[a]s residents of
metropolitan areas know from daily experience, confrontation by a person asking
for money disrupts passage and is more intrusive and intimidating than an
encounter with a person giving out information. 287
282. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
283. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
284. See U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3125 (1990) (Postal Service was
not granting to one side a "monopoly in expressing its views").
285. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1968).
286. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708 (1992).
287. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 734, 110 S. Ct. at 3123.
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Giving people a chance to walk down the street reasonably unencumbered
protects strollers, shoppers, storekeepers, and is a life-sustaining force for a
community. There are few state interests more pressing or more reasonable.
3. Narrow Tailoring
The time, place, and manner standard further requires that content-neutral
restrictions be narrowly tailored to achieve their purpose. 28 To be considered
narrowly tailored, it is not necessary that a statute create no burden on other
activities. "It is now well-settled that regulations restricting the time, place or
manner of expressive conduct do not violate the First Amendment 'simply
because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech." 289
It would be difficult to argue that a prohibition on begging in all public
places is narrowly tailored. On the other hand, prohibitions of aggressive
begging, and prohibitions on begging where it is especially intrusive, can and
have been interpreted as narrowly tailored.2 9 These measures are directed only
at accosts. Non-confrontational methods of solicitation are permitted, from an
open palm to an outright demand, as long as the beggar does not make his
appeal in the proscribed manner.
4. Alternative Channels of Communication
Opponents of restrictions on panhandling have claimed that such regulations
"silence debate about social policies toward the poor."29 ' This argument is
hogwash. The debate is ongoing, as manifested in everything from the recent
presidential election campaign to dinner party chatter.
Any law aimed specifically at begging, including the most restrictive, would
still leave open ample opportunities to express whatever political, social, or
economic message one desires. Indeed, among the possible methods of
communicating social ideas open to the destitute, begging for alms seems both
288. City of Beaufort v. Baker, 432 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1993).
289. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 159 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States
v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2906 (1985)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984, 111 S.
Ct. 516 (1990).
290. In Young, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held a complete prohibition of panhandling
in the New York City subway system to be narrowly tailored, because "the exigencies created by
begging and panhandling in the subway warrant the conduct's complete prohibition." 903 F.2d at
159. As Justice Kennedy noted, a prohibition on begging in New York area airports was narrowly
tailored because it affected only the action of receiving funds, rather than any speech. See
International Soc,y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2722 (1992) (Kennedy,
J. concurring).
291. Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the
Right to Beg, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 896, 897 (1991); see also Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999
F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
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one of the most dehumanizing and one of the least direct. If the beggar's real
complaint is with the treatment of the poor, providing a few coins hardly
addresses the problem or communicates any feeling about it.
The recent ordinances prohibiting aggressive begging do nothing to silence
this debate. Any message the solicitor wishes to convey concerning social policy
can be offered with impunity under these ordinances. Moreover, even a simple
request for alms may be made, if it is not made in the proscribed aggressive
manner. The panhandler, like all persons, remains free to communicate, if the
interests of others are properly respected. This is nothing more than the
corollary of the old adage about "your rights stopping at the tip of my nose."
C. The O'Brien Test
An alternative way to view panhandling restrictions is as a regulation on
conduct with an expressive element, as opposed to a restriction on the time,
place, and manner of speech. The Supreme Court's designated test for analyzing
restrictions on conduct with an expressive element is strikingly similar to its test
for time, place, and manner restrictions. The test was set forth in United States
v. O'Brien.
92
The O'Brien court started with the proposition that not all conduct was
protected speech.293 Regulations of expressive conduct, must, though: 1) be
within the constitutional power of government; 2) further an important or
substantial government interest; 3) represent a governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and 4) cause an incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms that is not greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
294
The constitutional-power-of-government question seems like a "throw away."
It appears to be aimed at ensuring that there is a legitimate reason for the
challenged governmental action. Protecting the public from harassment is a
legitimate purpose of government under our constitutional system as it has
developed.295
The other tests align with those for time, place, and manner restrictions. If
the restriction meets the prongs of one test, it has met the prongs of the other.
D. Commercial Speech
An alternative way for a reviewing court to evaluate the constitutionality of
a restriction or regulation on panhandling is as a restriction on commercial
292. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).
293. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (citing Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3255 (1984) ("Violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact ... are
entitled to no constitutional protection").
294. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S. Ct. at 1679.
295. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940).
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speech. Government controls on expression related solely to the economic
interest of the speaker or audience are provided with less First Amendment
protections than other, more substantive speech.2'9 Panhandling may very well
fall into the former category because the speaker is trying to increase his or her
personal wealth. A tangential connection to some public interest, even if it can
be found, will not remove the speech from the commercial category.2 97
The motivations of the panhandler are pecuniary. Although he may tell
passersby about his plight, or about the circumstances that led to it, his
motivation for doing so is to induce the giving of money. The fact that no goods
or services are exchanged is irrelevant because the motivation remains the desire
for money.
As the courts have told us, commercial speech receives less First Amend-
ment protection because greater regulatory power is deemed needed to protect
the public. The commercial speech is for profit, and therefore more subject to
abuse. Also, it contributes less to the fulfillment of the underlying values of the
First Amendment. 2
98
The government therefore has the power to completely ban forms of
commercial speech when it is presented in situations "inherently conducive to
overreaching and other forms of misconduct."299 The government's regulatory
power is diminished with regard to commercial speech that is not misleading or
coercive. It is uncertain whether panhandling falls into this category.
There is some threat of fraudulent inducement by panhandlers. Frequently,
panhandlers will tell passersby about emergencies, physical disabilities, or family
crises that do not exist. They will ask for money for commodities, without the
slightest intention of ever acquiring these items. They will claim a need to travel
to shelters, when either the shelter does not exist, or there is no intention to go
there.
Additionally, as the Supreme Court has observed, in-person solicitation is
inherently subject to fraud because of the lack of an opportunity to verify what
is being claimed:
Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and
leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may
exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without
providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and
effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presenta-
296. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563, 100
S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (1980).
297. There is, after all, some public value in the sale of many or possibly all commercial items,
from cars to condoms. Cf id.; see also Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-75, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3031-32 (1989).
298. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978). This may be
silly, as we have all met people whose passion boils over issues, not money.
299. Id. at 464, 98 S. Ct. at 1923.
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tion and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decisionmaking;
there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education ....300
If, however, a court were to find that panhandling is not misleading, a
restriction can still be constitutional if it advances a substantial interest and is
only as extensive as necessary to achieve that interest.301 The "necessary"
requirement is read loosely and does not require the least restrictive alternative
to be used.302
Because panhandling restrictions can be an effective way of alleviating one
of the major causes of urban incivility, and because the restrictions are addressed
precisely at this problem, controls on begging can be upheld as restrictions on
commercial speech. This can be done without any finding in regard to the
veracity of the statements made. Of course, if a court agrees that these
statements run a substantial risk of fraud, then a more permissive test would be
applied.
E. Where are We: The Convergence of Constitutional Tests and Factors
A restriction on panhandling need only be upheld under one of the appropri-
ate tests. The test employed will depend upon whether the court views the
restriction as: 1) a restriction of activity not protected by the First Amendment;
2) a time, place, and manner restriction (to be evaluated using the four-prong test
in the preceding section); 3) a restriction on conduct with an expressive element
(using the similar test discussed above); or 4) a restriction on purely commercial
speech. If the restriction is acceptable under any of these tests, it is constitution-
al. If an anti-begging law cannot meet the requirements of any of these tests, it
will be deemed a restriction on the content of speech, and it will run into a near-
absolute First Amendment test.
F. The Boos v. Barry Test
Because it does not prohibit intimidating or coercive speech unrelated to
soliciting alms, a prohibition of aggressive begging could be held to be content-
based. Nonetheless, such a law could still be constitutional as an appropriate
regulation of speech. For a content-based regulation in a public forum to be
constitutional, the state must show that it is "necessary to serve a compelling
300. Id. at 457, 98 S. Ct. at 191. See also 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1992) (Federal Trade Commission
rule requiring three day "cooling-off period" for door-to-door sales, making it an unfair trade practice
to sell door-to-door without it).
301. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 100 S. Ct.
2343, 2350 (1980).
302. Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477, 109 S.
Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989).
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state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."30 3  This
standard is rarely met.3"
With regard to regulations of "pure speech," which may present certain
dangers to the community, the Supreme Court has stated: "The government may
'protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression
which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance. '''3° Moreover, cities
have the power "to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.""
The well-being, as well as the existence of a diverse, interactive community is
at stake in preserving the unhindered use of public spaces.
The Blair court, apparently unconvinced of a need for attractive public
spaces, held that the State had not presented a compelling interest to justify
California's anti-aggressive begging statute. It reasoned that "preventing an
intrusion on the public at large is no more compelling a justification for this
limitation on speech than is avoiding annoyance. ' 3°7
As previously noted, "face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that
are an appropriate target of regulation. '30 8 Such accosts are completely unlike
non-confrontational solicitation, "[a]s residents of metropolitan areas know from
daily experience, confrontation by a person asking for money disrupts passage
and is more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter with a person giving out
information." 3° 9 Thus, the state may have a compelling interest in specifically
prohibiting confrontational demands for money. Furthermore, while older
statutes were aimed at removing beggars as an undesirable class, current
ordinances are tailored specifically to the compelling goal of preventing
intimidation, coercion, and threat.
American governments have banned all kinds of solicitations that do not
contain physical threats or a clear and present danger of physical violence, such
as solicitations for prostitution or illegal drugs, and the prohibition of tobacco
advertising on television.3 t  Whatever the merits of controls on private
prostitution and obscenity, 31' the effect on the community of aggressive
303. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988) (quoting Perry Education
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983). See also
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969) (per curiam).
304. See Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 705-06 (2d Cir. 1993).
305. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 156 (2d Cir.) (quoting Members of
the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2128
(1984), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990)).
306. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83, 69 S. Ct. 448, 451 (1949).
307. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
308. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708 (1992).
309. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733-34 (1990).
310. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding
prohibition of electronic advertising of cigarettes), affd, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405
U.S. 1000, 92 S. Ct. 1289 and National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000, 92 S.
Ct. 1290 (1972).
311. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 98 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
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panhandling seems more immediate, dangerous, and prevalent. It would seem
that the regulatory power that reaches sex and obscenity can also reach begging.
It appears that if the initial issues are lost, and prohibitions on aggressive
begging are deemed to be a content-based restriction on protected speech, then
they are likely to be struck down. Although the motivating causes for these
measures are exceedingly important, they probably cannot justify the squelching
of a particular message or viewpoint presented on the public sidewalks.
G. Overbreadth
The "overbreadth" doctrine was developed to prevent "laws that are written
so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third
parties." ' 2 A challenge of overbreadth may be brought by one whose actions
were validly forbidden on behalf of others not before the court, whose
constitutionally-protected expression could potentially be punished under the
challenged statute, or whose protected expression has been inhibited, or chilled,
by the broad sweep of the statute's language. The United States Supreme Court
has made it very clear that the overbreadth must be substantial, stating that "the
mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute
is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge."3"3
The overbreadth doctrine is often seen, incorrectly, as a separate ground of
constitutional attack. For instance, it may be said that a law violates the First
Amendment and is overbroad. It is more accurate to say that overbreadth is a
broad expansion of the standing doctrine, allowing those caught in conduct
dangerous to others to argue about the First Amendment concerns of others.
There are several ways in which an anti-begging statute might be drafted
with excessive broadness. First, a statute could, instead of specifying "begging"
or "panhandling," prohibit "solicitation" or any other broad term of that sort.
Charitable solicitations, protected in the past because of its connection to a
variety of important community interests, would fall within the purview of this
type of statute." 4 Additionally, a pedestrian interference ordinance could be
unconstitutionally overbroad if it did not specifically condemn intentionally
blocking pedestrian traffic, thus punishing any person who accidentally blocks
another's path.315
312. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798,
104 S. Ct. 2118, 2125 (1984).
313. Id. at 800, 104 S. Ct. at 2126. See also City of Seattle v. Huff, 767 P.2d 572, 573 (Wash.
1989) ("a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct") (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S. Ct.
2502, 2508 (1987)).
314. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S. Ct.
826, 833 (1980).
315. City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990).
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An ordinance which specifically prohibits non-passive begging, panhandling,
or soliciting alms for oneself would not be substantially overbroad as only the
conduct harmful to safe, welcoming public spaces is proscribed. Similarly, one
would expect that a statute forbidding begging in a manner which would
reasonably be perceived as intimidating or threatening would also be held not to
be substantially overbroad.
H. Vagueness
A statute which is so vague that a reasonable person would not know what
conduct is prohibited, or is so vague that it is "susceptible to arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement,"3 6 is unconstitutional because it denies the
due process mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. When determining
whether a given statute is unconstitutionally vague:
[s]trict specificity is not required; the exact point where actions cross
the line into prohibited conduct need not be predicted. "[I]f [persons]
of ordinary intelligence can understand a penal statute notwithstanding
some possible areas of disagreement, it is not wanting in certainty." A
statute is not unconstitutional "if the general area of conduct against
which it is directed is made plain. 317
Thus, a statute forbidding "begging" or "panhandling," whether in public spaces
or in a limited area, should not be unconstitutionally vague as the terms are
reasonably clear and specific. Courts that have addressed this issue have
uniformly agreed.3"'
VI. A MODEL ANTI-AGGRESSIVE SOLICITATION ORDINANCE
Some communities have attempted to address the problem of urban security
and civility by attempting to prohibit all panhandling. Such measures can be
seen as attempts to protect the public and to lead people away from a life on the
streets. Begging bans, if enforced, would greatly contribute to the safety,
civility, and serenity of public spaces, and would be easy to enforce.
Despite the efficacy of complete begging prohibitions, many legislatures are
likely to conclude that people suffering from severe personal problems should
have an opportunity to passively seek charity. Therefore, only the more
aggressive methods of panhandling are likely to be prohibited. This approach
increases the chance that the ordinance would survive a constitutional challenge.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1338-39 (quoting City of Seattle v. Huff, 767 P.2d 572, 575 (1988)) (emphasis
supplied).




Of course, while a more moderate approach avoids Loper, it may run into the
brick wall of Blair. The adoption of a prohibition only on aggressive begging,
however, not only reaches out to those who may be legitimately in need, but also
focuses on conduct rather than speech. This type of regulation, therefore, has a
far greater chance of being upheld. A tailored approach allows some bothersome
conduct, and forgoes the use of an easy "bright-line" test, but also allows people
to passively solicit alms. Moreover, an anti-aggressive solicitation approach is
a far cry from doing nothing; it is needed, appropriate, balanced, and constitu-
tional.
No piece of legislation comes with any guarantee of constitutionality.
Indeed, with the quantity of lawyers and litigants, lawsuits will undoubtedly
challenge any attempt to prohibit or control vile forms of begging. This is true
regardless of the extent of the problem, and regardless of the approach chosen
by the legislature.
The object is not to provide a lawsuit-proof law, but to offer an ordinance
designed to meet the challenges and concerns expressed by courts. The model
ordinance below is also designed to be balanced and effective, as it is focused
on the most egregious of the problems presented by street panhandlers:
Begging and Soliciting Money
Section 1.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit money or other
things of value, or to solicit the sale of goods or services, in an
aggressive manner in a public area.
(b) For purposes of this section "to solicit money" shall include,
without limitation, the spoken, written, or printed word or such other
acts or bodily gestures as are conducted in furtherance of the purposes
of obtaining alms.
(c) "Aggressive Manner," for purposes of this section, shall be
defined as:
1. Intentionally or recklessly making any physical contact with
or touching another person in the course of the solicitation, or
approaching within an arm's length of the person, except with
the person's consent;
2. Following the person being solicited, if that conduct is: a)
intended to or is likely to cause a reasonable person to fear
imminent bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act
upon property in the person's possession, or b) is intended to
or is reasonably likely to intimidate the person being solicited
into responding affirmatively to the solicitation;
3. Continuing to solicit within five feet of the person being
solicited after the person has made a negative response, if
continuing the solicitation is: a) intended to or is likely to
cause a reasonable person to fear imminent bodily harm or the
commission of a criminal act upon property in the person's
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possession, or b) is intended to or is reasonably likely to
intimidate the person being solicited into responding affirma-
tively to the solicitation;
4. Intentionally or recklessly blocking the passage of the
person being solicited or requiring the person, or the driver of
a vehicle, to take evasive action to avoid physical contact with
the person making the solicitation;
5. Intentionally or recklessly: a) speaking at an unreasonably
loud volume under the circumstances; or b) using words: 1)
intended to or likely to cause a reasonable person to fear
imminent bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act
upon property in the person's possession, or 2) words likely to
intimidate the person into responding affirmatively to the
solicitation; or
6. Approaching the person being solicited in a manner that:
a) is likely to cause a reasonable person to fear imminent
bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act upon property
in the person's possession, or b) is likely to intimidate the
person being solicited into responding affirmatively to the
solicitation;
(d) "Public area," for purposes of this section, means an area open
to use by the general public, including, but not limited to, alleys,
bridges, buildings, driveways, parking lots, parks, plazas, sidewalk§, and
streets open to the general public, and the doorways and entrances to
buildings and dwellings, and the grounds enclosing them.
Section 2.
(a) It shall be unlawful to solicit money or other things of value,
or to solicit the sale of goods or services in any public transportation
vehicle, or bus or subway station or stop.
Section 3.,
It shall be unlawful to solicit money or other things of value, or to
solicit the sale of goods or services, if the person making the solicitation
knows or reasonably should know that the solicitation is occurring
within ten feet of an automated teller machine, or within ten feet of any
entrance or exit to a building containing an automated teller machine,
unless a private owner of the property covered by this clause consents
to such solicitations.
Section 4.
It shall be unlawful to solicit money or other things of value, or to
solicit the sale of goods or services on private property or residential
property, if the owner, tenant, or lawful occupant has asked the person
not to panhandle on the property, or has posted a sign clearly indicating




It shall be unlawful to solicit money or other things of value, or to
solicit the sale of goods or services from any operator of a motor
vehicle that is in traffic on a public street, whether in exchange for
cleaning the vehicle's windows or otherwise.
Section 6.
It shall be unlawful to solicit money or other things of value from
any operator or occupant of a motor vehicle on a public street in
exchange for blocking, occupying, or reserving a public space, or
directing the occupant to a public parking space.
Section 7.
A violation of this ordinance may be punished by a fine not to
exceed Five Hundred Dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not to
exceed ninety days, or by both, or by a required public service work, or
by a suspension of public benefits.
Section 8.
Any arrest or conviction under this Ordinance shall be disclosed to
public and private social service agencies who request the [the
applicable public official] to be notified of such events.
Section 9.
No person found to have violated this ordinance more than one
time shall have access to city-owned or city-funded shelters until six
months have passed since the last determination of such a violation.
Section 10.
This ordinance is not intended to proscribe any demand for
payment for services rendered or goods delivered.
Section 11.
If any section, sentence, clause, or phrase of this Ordinance is held
invalid, or unconstitutional by any court of competent jurisdicti6n, then
said holding shall in no way affect the validity of the remaining portions
of this ordinance.
This ordinance lists specific actions that are prohibited when they occur in
the context of begging, while allowing beggars to say anything they please on
the street. Additionally, it prohibits begging in locales that are particularly
threatening or intrusive. Thus, any First Amendment attack would have to assert
that one's constitutionally protected right to free expression includes physical
contact, causing fear, nagging, or blocking the way of others, as well as a right
to beg in the public venue of one's choosing.
The model ordinance takes advantage of the Young and Kokinda decisions
by creating a begging-free zone in the subways, as well as near bank machines,
* where there is no practical means of escaping the solicitors. Private property
owners are exempted from the reach of this clause, as the community's interest
in its urban spaces is unaffected.
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The inclusion of bus stops is somewhat risky, as these venues were not
covered in the Supreme Court decisions. 3 9  They are included with the
understanding that important areas of public transport can be designated as zones
where people should be free from unwanted harassment.
The ordinance includes a provision to provide an active discouragement to
aggressive begging separate and apart from the criminal justice system. It calls
for disclosure to social service agencies who ask for this information. The clause
enables social service providers to ensure that their clients respect the privacy
and safety of others.320 It is anticipated that these agencies will counsel the
affected individuals with an eye toward encouraging more socially-adoptive and
productive behavior. These agencies may also choose to cut off the provision
of services to those beggars who continue to violate the ordinance.
Finally, a clause ties the provision of taxpayer-funded shelter to compliance
with the anti-aggressive panhandling law. This provision is aimed at a non-
incarceration deterrent and ensures that the city will not be subsidizing someone
who is harming the community, while focusing limited social service resources
on those willing to not beg in an aggressive manner.
The ordinance thus respects and protects expression, while also protecting
civility and privacy, or, the "right to be left alone ... and enjoy public facilities
without interference. 32'
VII. CONCLUSION
What is at stake in the regulation of begging is communities' ability to set
minimum standards of public conduct. Such standards are necessary if
individuals are going to voluntarily spend their time in public spaces.
Communities which enact such ordinances are not forsaking their destitute
citizens. As George Will noted, "[t]he question of what society owes in
compassionate help to street people is, surely, severable from the question of
what right the community has to protect a minimally civilized ambience in public
spaces. ' 322 The proponents of reasonable anti-aggressive begging legislation
seek communities where people interact with their fellow citizens and leave
behind their isolation and segregation.
319. But see Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
affd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A regulation prohibiting all solicitation in a ten-block radius
from Grand Central Station during the rush hour no doubt might constitute a reasonable time, place,
and manner restriction."). We cannot glean what the court meant by "no doubt might."
320. The policy is modeled after the one used by the South of Market Multi-Service Center, a
provider of shelter and social services in San Francisco. The policy was abandoned when the ACLU
complained about it.
321. Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1042.




An absolute right to beg may please those who see the courts as the answer
to all social problems, see good in a life asking for money in the street, and see
value in allowing people to conduct themselves in any manner, regardless of the
cost to others. Such a view, however, must take into account those who will
withdraw out of fear or out of revulsion. That leaves urban public spaces
abandoned by the majority creating a haven for crime.
A moderate approach to the problems of urban civility is possible. This
article presents such a solution for the increasing scourge of aggressive
panhandling. The approach presented is precise, aimed at conduct, permissive
of the expression of all views and opinions, backed by a long history of
governmental and societal concern, and supported by the substantial weight of
judicial authority.
Tolerance for standards of public conduct does not mean a tolerance for
authoritarianism. Ordered liberty is an attraction of this country, 323 and the
basis for its democracy and freedoms. The purpose of the ordinances proposed
here is, to quote the Preamble of the Constitution, "to insure domestic tranquil-
ity.' 3 24 A little more tranquility on the public streets would benefit us all.
323. The term comes from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.).
324. U.S. Const. pmbl.
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